Issue: 7672
The subslice transform creates a slice of the input buffer.
Specify the subslice desired -- nbytes and truncate are optional:
subslice: offset <,nbytes> <,truncate>
offset: Specifies the starting offset for the new subslice. When
negative, expresses how far from the end of the input buffer to begin.
nbytes: Specifies the size of the subslice. When negative, specifies
that the subslice will end that many bytes from the end of the input
buffer. Nbytes must be non-zero.
When nbytes is not specified, the size of the subslice will be the size
of the input buffer - offset.
truncate: Specify behavior when offset + nbytes exceeds buffer length.
When present, trims nbytes such that offset + nbytes equals buffer
length. When not present, an empty buffer is produced.
Examples:
subslice: 1; - The subslice will be a copy of the input
buffer but omits the input buffer's first byte
"This is Suricata" -> "his is Suricata"
subslice: 0, 13; - The slice is created from the first 13 bytes
of the input buffer
"This is Suricata" -> "This is Suric"
subslice: 10, -5; - The subslice is created starting at offset 10
and continues to 5 bytes before the end of the input buffer
"This is Suricata" -> "r"
subslice: -3; - The subslice will be the last 3 bytes of the
input buffer.
"This is Suricata" -> "ata"
Store the NTP reference ID as raw network-order bytes so it can be
exposed as a sticky buffer and matched with payload keywords. The
reference ID is often a 4 character string, or an IP address and not
just an integer identifier.
Updates the log reference ID to be a string of colon separated hex
digits as this matches what tshark does.
Ticket: #8488
NotRequest and NotResponse event type have never been used.
Unsolicited is also unused, however there is a rule for it so removing
support would be a breaking change at this time.
Since snmp txs are created at progress 1 which is the completion,
this does not change detection, except allowing firewall mode
to use these keywords with generic hook like
snmp:request_complete
Ticket: 8395
Ticket: 8395
For protocols where tx are complete at start, that is
the `tx_get_progress` function returns 1 inconditionnally,
we can use the progress 1, not losing time on detection in ips
mode, and getting ready for firewall mode
For the other protocols (where a tx needs both a request and response
for instance), keep progress 0 as was the case before
Ticket: 8413
RFC 6455 Section 5.4 states
Control frames (see Section 5.5) MAY be injected in the middle of
a fragmented message.
Control frames are identified by opcodes where the most significant
bit of the opcode is 1.
So that we can log and detect on interface uuids, even if
AlterContext packets change one of the contexts, but other contexts
are still used after it in request/responses
Ticket: 8378
Ticket: 8375
logger already read this variable but it was never set, and
the rust compiler did not warn about this
Allows to log the interface uuid when ctx_id > 0
Wireshark filter for related pcaps
dcerpc.cn_ctx_id > 0 && dcerpc.pkt_type == 0
Ticket: 8289
If stream.reassembly.depth is unlimited,
an attacker controlling the 2 sides of a communication going through Suricata
can send a transition with an infinite number of headers, until suricata OOMs
Solution is to offer a configuration option to bound the number
of HTTP2 frames we store in a HTTP2 transaction, and produce an
anomaly if this bound is crossed
Ticket: 8292
When we have buffered something in ctx.decoded_line,
we already looked for '\n' in it, so we do not need to run it again
Otherwise, callers that supply mime_smtp_find_url_strings with
a few bytes at a time without "\n", have a quadratic
complexity
It's not possible to use all the functions and macros from the ffi crate
in the main Suricata crate, as there are conditionals around when
running in test mode, and "cargo test" doesn't propagate the "cfg(test)"
to test crates.
Which for now means duplicating the macros and some functions.
Previously we were boxing a u8 and returning it as a pointer to a
boolean. While this is probably not an issue itself, the value 2 was
allowed to be converted to a boolean, which is undefined behavior in
Rust.
and bindgen it to rust
Will make easier the bindgen of RustParser structure which uses
a callback which uses AppLayerTxData
Move also the free function to C SCAppLayerTxDataCleanup
As suricata-sys crate defines AppLayerTxData for rust,
It must itself implement the Drop trait, and thus,
We need to define a feature surest
and bindgen it to rust
Will make easier the bindgen of RustParser structure which uses
a callback which uses AppLayerResult
Keep From<> impl in sys crate that defines it
and bindgen it to rust, and use default trait instead of new
Will make easier the bindgen of RustParser structure which uses
a callback which uses AppLayerStateData
Unittests test_parse_bind_pdu_infinite_loop and
test_parse_bindack_pdu_infinite_loop seem to have artificially made up
header which does not hold up to the strict calculations enforced by the
parser now. Their headers mark the fraglens as 64 and 72 respectively
which are not enough to hold the kind of bind(ack) items that are expected.
It worked so far as the parser passed the entire input slice around but
with the bugfix for issue 7546, the input passed around is strictly
restricted to the fraglen parsed in the header.
Bug 7546
So far, the fraglen defined in the header was used inconsistently in
certain places to define bounds on input length. Make it consistent by
making sure that only a slice up until fraglen is passed around as that
is the maximum length the fragment should have.
With the help of Applayer::incomplete API, the case when the
stream_slice passed to the parser is smaller than the header defined
fraglen is already handled.
Bug 7546
The parser could receive an input that consists of arbitrary data post
gap. This is handled in the beginning of the fn handle_input_data.
However, the rest of the calculation does not take into account the
bytes that were consumed at this stage. Fix the indices and calculations
to consider a new DCERPC fragment beginning post these consumed bytes.
warning: called `unwrap` on `rd.pipe` after checking its variant with `is_some`
--> src/smb/smb1.rs:858:28
|
857 | if rd.pipe.is_some() {
| -------------------- help: try: `if let Some(<item>) = rd.pipe`
858 | let pipe = rd.pipe.unwrap();
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
= help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/rust-1.93.0/index.html#unnecessary_unwrap
= note: `#[warn(clippy::unnecessary_unwrap)]` on by default
Header handling is wrong in the case
packet A to server is fragmented (return AppLayerResult::incomplete)
packet B is to client, but uses the header of the to_server packet
Bug 7547
DCERPC parsers had no upper bounds when it came to extending the stub
data buffer. Traffic can be crafted to bypass some internal parser
conditions to create an indefinite buffering in the stub_data array that
can make Suricata crash.
Add a default limit of 1MiB and make it configurable for the user.
Security 8182
Co-authored-by: Philippe Antoine <pantoine@oisf.net>
TLS parsers use x509-parser crate which parses X.509 certificates that
use ASN.1 DER encoding that can allow arbitrary byte sequences. An
attacker could inject null byte in a certificate anywhere to stump the
common language parsers terminating the string at a null byte leading to
a bypass of a possibly malicious certificate.
So far, the rust TLS parser for "subjectaltname" used a pattern that involved:
-> Get ASN.1 DER encoded raw data from the x509-parser crate
-> Convert this raw data to a decoded string (Rust)
-> Convert the Rust string to CString
-- The problem lies here. CString only accepts proper strings/byte
buffers and converts it into an owned C-compatible, null-terminated
string. However, if any null byte occurs in the string passed to the
CString then it panics.
In the rust TLS parser, this panic is handled by returning NULL.
This means that the parser will error out during the decoding of the
certificate. However, Suricata must be able to detect the null byte
injection attack being an IDS/IPS.
Hence, replace all such string patterns w.r.t. TLS SAN with a byte
array.
Bug 7887
TLS parsers use x509-parser crate which parses X.509 certificates that
use ASN.1 DER encoding that can allow arbitrary byte sequences. An
attacker could inject null byte in a certificate anywhere to stump the
common language parsers terminating the string at a null byte leading to
a bypass of a possibly malicious certificate.
So far, the rust TLS parser for "issuerdn" used a pattern that involved:
-> Get ASN.1 DER encoded raw data from the x509-parser crate
-> Convert this raw data to a decoded string (Rust)
-> Convert the Rust string to CString
-- The problem lies here. CString only accepts proper strings/byte
buffers and converts it into an owned C-compatible, null-terminated
string. However, if any null byte occurs in the string passed to the
CString then it panics.
In the rust TLS parser, this panic is handled by returning NULL.
This means that the parser will error out during the decoding of the
certificate. However, Suricata must be able to detect the null byte
injection attack being an IDS/IPS.
Hence, replace all such string patterns w.r.t. TLS IssuerDN with a byte
array.
Bug 7887
TLS parsers use x509-parser crate which parses X.509 certificates that
use ASN.1 DER encoding that can allow arbitrary byte sequences. An
attacker could inject null byte in a certificate anywhere to stump the
common language parsers terminating the string at a null byte leading to
a bypass of a possibly malicious certificate.
So far, the rust TLS parser for "Subject" used a pattern that involved:
-> Get ASN.1 DER encoded raw data from the x509-parser crate
-> Convert this raw data to a decoded string (Rust)
-> Convert the Rust string to CString
-- The problem lies here. CString only accepts proper strings/byte
buffers and converts it into an owned C-compatible, null-terminated
string. However, if any null byte occurs in the string passed to the
CString then it panics.
In the rust TLS parser, this panic is handled by returning NULL.
This means that the parser will error out during the decoding of the
certificate. However, Suricata must be able to detect the null byte
injection attack being an IDS/IPS.
Hence, replace all such string patterns w.r.t. TLS Subject with a byte
array.
Bug 7887
The functionality of "both" can already be easily achieved by using both
"toclient" and "toserver" in a rule. This just adds the ease of
expression in rule. As it is added now, check the direction for the
pre-existing users of direction as well.
While debug_validate_bug_on is still used, it does not need to be
imported directly, as that macro is marked with `macro_export`, making
it globally available to the crate.
Ticket: 6724
Allows to use numerical values for example
Also fixes some unit tests that were returning 1 after goto error
FlagsTestParse05 especially took this path as
de->ignored_flags != (TH_SYN|TH_RST) was false
we had de->ignored_flags == 0xff ^ (TH_SYN|TH_RST)
And then, we had a match, instead of what the not-run code
was supposing.
Ticket: 6724
Allows sugar syntax for bitflags keywords.
While the expressivity does not increase, because we could already
use numerial values with all generic integer modes, this modifier
prefix is used with the strings, and follows the syntax
that is already used for fragbits and tcp.flags keyword.
So that http2.frametype and http2.errorcode can use EnumString
without changing the format, as they used UPPERCASE instead of
the default EnumString snake_case
IKE attributes are an array of TLV style objects, this means there can
be duplicate types seen on the wire. However, Suricata logs these as a
mapping with the type as the key. This can result in the JSON
containing duplicate keys.
To address this, log the attributes as an array of objects, allow
duplicates to exist, for example:
"client": {
"proposals": [
{
"sa_life_duration": "Unknown",
"sa_life_duration_raw": 86400,
}
}
}
is now logged as:
"client": {
"proposals": [
{"key": "sa_life_duration", "value": "Unknown", "raw": 86400}
]
}
Also adds `"version": 2` to each IKE record to note the change of
format from previous versions.
Ticket: #7902