block_scrutinee now warns on a block-wrapped if let scrutinee, since
the block changes when temporaries drop. The file config reads in the
nfs, smb and http2 gettxfiles handlers were wrapped in a pointless
single-expression block; remove it.
A response line carrying a code but no message, such as "221 \r\n" sent by
some servers in reply to QUIT, was logged with no completion_code, and with
the code itself in the reply field:
{"command": "QUIT", "reply": ["221"], "reply_received": "yes"}
parse_response_line split caused problems on no response message and prevented good logging of completion code
Ticket: #8966
The internal type set for datasets of type IP is IPv6, however, the
expectation is that it'll support IPv6, standard IPv4 as well as IPv4 in
IPv6 notation. A regression happened during the conversion of datasets
parsing to rust wherein standard IPv4 was rejected with IP type. Fix
that by handling IPv4 standard notation in IPv6 handler.
Fixes: bc79300dfa ("datasets: move initial file reading to rust")
Ticket: 9006
Ticket: 9096
In case of a 100-continue response, we used to
- parse the response line, set progress to headers
- parse headers, set progress back to line
This caused FPs as the engine expects the progress to just increase
so that it skips signatures that did not match yet, and whose
progress is less than the tx progress.
Solution is to keep progress at line when we see a 100 response,
until we get to the body, or after a next response line which
is not 100.
While the pgsql parser is disabled if its setting is present in the yaml
config file, it is actually enabled if truly defaulted, that is, if not
present in the settings.
Actually disable pgsql parsing and logging if not present in the
suricata.yaml config. This implies that eve output enabling isn't enough
to enable the parser, now.
Bug: #8349
The byte backstop leaves many tiny OOO chunks unbounded, and the scan
only inspected the in-progress file, which an interleaved second
handle could hide. Add a chunk-count backstop (configured count, 1024
hard cap when disabled) and check every open file tx.
Ticket: #8791.
Replace the hardcoded 2 MiB gap backstop, which silently truncated
OOO file data, with the configured queue size per direction (1 GiB
hard cap when disabled), raising SMBEvent::TruncatedFileData. It runs
ahead of the chunk_left == 0 early return, and a gap reaching the
tracker tags the session gapped even when fully consumed.
Ticket: #8791.
The SMB1 WRITE_ANDX/READ_ANDX handlers fed the file tracker
unconditionally and SMB2 only checked raw in-flight occupancy. Apply
the max-{read,write}-queue-{size,cnt} checks, projected onto actual
queue growth, to both protocols' found and create-new tx branches;
on overflow raise the queue event and skip the record's remainder.
Ticket: #8791.
The chunk-continuation queue-limit rejection accounted its stream
consumption and skip from the count-based chunk promise
(chunk_left), but the parser accepts file_len < count and the
tracker only ever consumes file_len bytes. With count > file_len
the consume/skip ran past the record's actual tail into the
following RPC record and the stream desynced.
Consume/skip from the record's unbuffered tail plus the record's
XDR padding.
Ticket: #8791.
Rework the queue-limit gap backstop: fall back to a 1 GiB / 1024
chunk hard cap when the limits are disabled, run it ahead of the
chunk_left == 0 early return, and scan every open file tx in the
direction (an interleaved handle can hide a first file's queue).
TruncatedFileData is attributed to the truncated tx.
Ticket: #8791.
The chunk path (filetracker_update) enqueued per-segment data with no
queue limit. Check the limits on every enqueuing path, projected onto
actual queue growth: only OOO data at a new offset grows the queue,
and only a new OOO chunk adds a map entry. Overflow raises the queue
event on the affected tx and skips to the record boundary.
Replace the 2 MiB gap backstop with a queue-limit one (the chunk-count
cap and all-open-file scan come next), and tag the session gapped on
every gap (even one fully covered by a skip), since the backstop is
gated on that flag. Rejected and evicted tx now release their file
resources so the file logger can clean them up.
Ticket: #8791.
Replace the hardcoded 16 MiB record caps with configurable
max-{write,read}-size and observable events: an oversized WRITE
request or READ response is rejected, logged, and its payload skipped
to keep the stream in sync. 0 disables the check.
For v4 records, the issue is more complex due to the COMPOUND type:
A partial v4 COMPOUND record whose frag_len claim is huge must not be
buffered toward that claim (31-bit, attacker-controlled → OOM). The
full parser can't help: on a partial buffer it only returns Incomplete
("need more bytes"), with no information about what's coming. The scan
instead walks the buffered prefix's ops by wire extent and reads the
file op's header words alone, answering the gate's four-way question:
oversized claim detected (reject + skip to the record boundary before
any data buffers), data not yet present (buffer normally), structurall
malformed (bounded rejection), or no oversized op (fall through). It
exists because rejecting before buffering requires the claimed length,
which only a prefix walk can extract.
Ticket: #8791.
Bound the per-file-transaction OOO queue, mirroring SMB: add
max-{read,write}-queue-{size,cnt} (0 disables, default 64 MiB / 64),
raise a queue event on overflow, and skip the truncated record's
remainder from the stream.
Ticket: #8791.
When the PADDED flag is set on HTTP/2 HEADERS or PUSH_PROMISE frames,
the parser reads the 1-byte Pad Length field but never strips trailing
padding bytes before passing the buffer to the HPACK decoder.
Fix by stripping trailing padding before invoking the HPACK decoder.
Ticket: #8787.
The on-demand buffer growth introduced for SWF decompression called
lzma_decompress again from byte zero each time the output buffer filled.
Because lzma-rs can buffer up to a dictionary before writing, a single
SWF could be decoded repeatedly as the buffer grew, amplifying CPU use.
This adds a depth-bounded Rust writer that asks C to grow the inspection
buffer as decompressed bytes are emitted.
This keeps a single lzma-rs stream alive, so the input is decoded only once.
Ticket: #8829
Previously, SWF decompression guessed the final output size from FileLength,
allocated the whole buffer, and then decompressed once. A malicious SWF could
claim a 50MB output and force the per-thread inspection buffer to allocate and
retain 64 MiB before the compressed data was even checked.
Change the logic:
allocate 4 KiB, decompress, grow only when the buffer is full, and continue.
The buffer grows geometrically up to the configured output limit,
and the final inspection length is set to the number of bytes actually produced.
Also, for zlib, Z_OK does not by itself mean that decompression is complete.
It should be checked together with avail_out and avail_in,
grow the buffer when output space is exhausted, and continue the same inflate stream.
Ticket: #8829
The check was too weak: it allowed fh_handles far beyond what fits
in the remaining input, letting a crafted packet drive a large
Vec::with_capacity preallocation in nom7 count().
Bound fh_handles by the remaining input size and by 4096, the
maximum file layout stripe count used by the Linux kernel
(NFS4_PNFS_MAX_STRIPE_CNT).
Ticket: #8816.
Negotiate protocol parser used an unbounded many1(complete(...))
combinator over the entire remaining packet input, discarding both
wct and bcc fields. Each NUL byte yielded one empty "dialect" entry,
causing excessive memory use.
Use bcc to limit the parsing; the dialect count is then bounded by
bcc (u16).
Ticket: #8852.
This patch distinguishes malformed DHCP options from truncated ones.
Previously, the malformed_options field was never set and parsing errors in
overloaded file and sname fields were silently discarded.
This caused malformed options to be reported as truncated or not reported at all.
Classify errors in the primary option stream and overloaded fields.
Treat failures within fixed-size overloaded fields as malformed because those
fields are already fully present.
Ticket #8874
DHCP lease, renewal, and rebinding time options contain a four-byte value,
but the parser previously ignored their declared length and always consumed
four bytes.
Reject these options unless their length is exactly four to
prevent parser desynchronization and incorrect keyword matches.
Ticket #8873
DHCP option 0 is a one-byte padding field, but it was parsed as a generic TLV.
This consumed the following option code as its length and could prevent later
options from being inspected.
Handle PAD explicitly so parsing resumes at the next option.
Ticket #8819
Since the PostgreSQL protocol doesn't impose any clear limits to how
many responses a backend could send, add one to the app-proto parser.
Using 21-64 as the accepted values, and 64 as the default:
The Start-up phase may have up to 17-18 ParameterStatus messages, plus
AuthOk, BackendKeyData and ReadyForQuery: 20, with extra room to be on
the safer side: 21
And 64 as upper limit, because as we currently summarize query
responses, we already don't get flooded by DataRow and Copy responses
messages, so we don't expect to see that many responses in a single
transaction for the pgsql, with the current implementation.
Ticket: #7263
Pgsql logger would only open a ParameterStatus message array and only
close it when a different type of message was seen (following an
expected pgsql transaction style). However, if no different type of
message followed the ParameterStatus message, the array remained open,
leading to an unbalanced `}` count, and poisoning the whole JSON log,
from that point on.
Now, if we finish the responses logging loop without reaching another
type of response, close the array, regardless.
Ticket: #9012
parse_row_description and parse_consolidated_data_row read a field_count
from the message body and use that to iterate a slice, without checking
whether the count actually fits the body.
A backend-controlled attack could lead to fewer fields logged, or
stalling of the parser to-client direction for the duration of the flow.
A malformed_response event is set for pgsql, if either of those
message's inner parsers has a field_count that can't be reconciled with
the body slice.
A new pgsql.response log field is added to indicate this, too:
pgsql.response.row_description_malformed, a boolean. This wasn't added
to the consolidated data row message, per its summarization nature.
The row_description unit test buffer declared a length one byte longer
than its three fields occupy. The old code silently discarded that
surplus byte; the new one reports it, so the buffer was corrected.
Ticket: #8885
Avoids pushing multiple log messages, when the consumer will
only set one app-layer event for the tx
Also, this is a warning, not an error, as we continue parsing.
Ticket: 8867
Ticket: 8800
Thus avoiding unbounded recursion
Before that, parse_payload could call
parse_security_association_payload which could call back
parse_payload if a type in the list was SecurityAssociation
But a Security Association only accepts the type Proposal in its
payload, see RFC 2408: section 3.5
There was another recursive path with parse_payload calling
parse_proposal_payload which called back parse_payload
And a Proposal only accepts the type Transform in its payload, see
RFC 2408: section 3.6
Fixes: 9aeeac53 ("pgsql: remove probe_ts function")
When the probe_ts function was removed in 9aeeac532, the request gap
handling got inverted, preventing re-sync of the app-proto from the
frontend side.
This could lead to detection evasion after a gap.
Ticket: #8822
Ticket: 8755
The config parameter was only taken into account from the
settings frame HEADER_TABLE_SIZE
Emits an event http2.header_table_overflow when we have the first
header that we cannot keep in Suricata's memory due to the
configured limit.
parse_t123_tpkt runs the X.224 and X.223/MCS sub-parsers over the
length-bounded tpkt payload, but they use streaming nom parsers.
An inner length field overrunning the payload, such as an oversized
CS_CORE block, escaped as Err::Incomplete although the tpkt was fully
present.
This patch wraps the child parsers in complete() so Incomplete from within the
bounded payload becomes an Error.
The tpkt is then returned as an unrecognized Raw child, which the caller skips,
and parsing resumes at the next tpkt.
Ticket #8838
When an incomplete SSH_MSG_KEXINIT record has a body of at least
SSH_MAX_REASSEMBLED_RECORD_LEN bytes and hassh is enabled, record_left
was overwritten with the full body length even though the function
returns ok() and thus consumes the body bytes already present in the
input. The next call then over-skipped by that many bytes into the
following record, desynchronising the parser for that direction so
hassh was never computed and ssh.hassh keywords could not match.
This patch keeps the record_left computed from the bytes actually consumed in
the oversized path, and only use the full body length in the path that
returns incomplete, where the body bytes are delivered again.
Ticket #8837
MQTT5 logs user properties wherein a user can send any metadata
over the wire in the form of key-value pairs.
MQTT logger used these key-value pairs directly to populate the common
"properties" field. But we do not want to use arbitrary json keys
(which may contain arbitrary characters)
1. A fixed new child object to the common "properties" called
"user_properties" which carries a list of dicts.
2. Each key-value pair received as a part of the user properties is now
saved as:
"properties": {
...
"user_properties": [{"key": "mykey", "value": "myvalue"}]
...
}
instead of:
"properties": {
...
"key": "value"
...
}
Ticket: 8785
Keys were not encoded as json UTF-8 strings.
This allowed json injection/corruption when an attacker
could control the key and put special JSON chars in it
such as double quote. Encode the keys when needed.
Ticket: 8999
Victor Julien
Amir Boussejra
William Ling
Shivani Bhardwaj
Philippe Antoine
Jason Ish
Juliana Fajardini
Giuseppe Longo