Ticket: 5243
When switching from SMTP to TLS, and getting HTTP1 instead of
expected TLS, and HTTP1 requesting upgrade to HTTP2, we do not
overwrite the alproto_orig value so as not to have type confusion
in AppLayerParserStateProtoCleanup
We want to check that a rule beginning with alert http
can be valid, that is if either HTTP1 or HTTP2 is enabled.
So, AppLayerProtoDetectGetProtoName will do a more complex
check for this ALPROTO_HTTP (any).
- add nom parsers for decoding most messages from StartupPhase and
SimpleQuery subprotocols
- add unittests
- tests/fuzz: add pgsql to confyaml
Feature: #4241
DNP3, ENIP, HTTP2 and Modbus are supposed to be disabled
by default. That means the default configuration does it,
but that also means that, if they are not in suricata.yaml,
the protocol should stay disabled.
Renaming was done with shell commands, git mv for moving the files and content like
find -iname '*.c' | xargs sed -i 's/ikev1/ike/g' respecting the different mixes of upper/lower case.
Set "done flag" only if parsers for both directions are not found in a
case of midstream parsers from other direction are tried if nothing is found
for the initial one. "done flag" must be set if nothing is found in both
directions. Otherwise processing of incomplete data is terminated at the very
first try.
So that protocol detection does not run for too long because
TCPProtoDetectCheckBailConditions somehow relies on its TCP stream
to start from zero, which is not the case on protocol change
Adds also debug validation checks, such as
both sides are known on protocol change
And only sets once alproto_orig
If a pattern matches in the other direction, after
probing parser finished without finding a protocol,
we will rerun the probing parser, which will include
the newly protocol found by its pattern
It a protocol is found in a first direction, we should run the
probing parser, even if it is not in the known ports.
That can happen for HTTP2, where client magic is detected,
then server probe can be run
Replaces all patterns of SCLogError() followed by exit() with
FatalError(). Cocci script to do this:
@@
constant C;
constant char[] msg;
@@
- SCLogError(C,
+ FatalError(SC_ERR_FATAL,
msg);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
Closes redmine ticket 3188.
This commit adds support for the Remote Framebuffer Protocol (RFB) as
used, for example, by various VNC implementations. It targets the
official versions 3.3, 3.7 and 3.8 of the protocol and provides logging
for the RFB handshake communication for now. Logged events include
endpoint versions, details of the security (i.e. authentication)
exchange as well as metadata about the image transfer parameters.
Detection is enabled using keywords for:
- rfb.name: Session name as sticky buffer
- rfb.sectype: Security type, e.g. VNC-style challenge-response
- rfb.secresult: Result of the security exchange, e.g. OK, FAIL, ...
The latter could be used, for example, to detect brute-force attempts
on open VNC servers, while the name could be used to map unwanted VNC
sessions to the desktop owners or machines.
We also ship example EVE-JSON output and keyword docs as part of the
Sphinx source for Suricata's RTD documentation.
When Suricata picks up a flow it assumes the first packet is
toserver. In a perfect world without packet loss and where all
sessions neatly start after Suricata itself started, this would be
true. However, in reality we have to account for packet loss and
Suricata starting to get packets for flows already active be for
Suricata is (re)started.
The protocol records on the wire would often be able to tell us more
though. For example in SMB1 and SMB2 records there is a flag that
indicates whether the record is a request or a response. This patch
is enabling the procotol detection engine to utilize this information
to 'reverse' the flow.
There are three ways in which this is supported in this patch:
1. patterns for detection are registered per direction. If the proto
was not recognized in the traffic direction, and midstream is
enabled, the pattern set for the opposing direction is also
evaluated. If that matches, the flow is considered to be in the
wrong direction and is reversed.
2. probing parsers now have a way to feed back their understanding
of the flow direction. They are now passed the direction as
Suricata sees the traffic when calling the probing parsers. The
parser can then see if its own observation matches that, and
pass back it's own view to the caller.
3. a new pattern + probing parser set up: probing parsers can now
be registered with a pattern, so that when the pattern matches
the probing parser is called as well. The probing parser can
then provide the protocol detection engine with the direction
of the traffic.
The process of reversing takes a multi step approach as well:
a. reverse the current packets direction
b. reverse most of the flows direction sensitive flags
c. tag the flow as 'reversed'. This is because the 5 tuple is
*not* reversed, since it is immutable after the flows creation.
Most of the currently registered parsers benefit already:
- HTTP/SMTP/FTP/TLS patterns are registered per direction already
so they will benefit from the pattern midstream logic in (1)
above.
- the Rust based SMB parser uses a mix of pattern + probing parser
as described in (3) above.
- the NFS detection is purely done by probing parser and is updated
to consider the direction in that parser.
Other protocols, such as DNS, are still to do.
Ticket: #2572
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
This is a DHCP decoder and logger written in Rust. Unlike most
parsers, this one is stateless so responses are not matched
up to requests by Suricata. However, the output does contain
enough fields to match them up in post-processing.
Rules are included to alert of malformed or truncated options.
Add a new parser for Internet Key Exchange version (IKEv2), defined in
RFC 7296.
The IKEv2 parser itself is external. The embedded code includes the
parser state and associated variables, the state machine, and the
detection code.
The parser looks the first two messages of a connection, and analyzes
the client and server proposals to check the cryptographic parameters.
Philippe Antoine
Juliana Fajardini
Emmanuel Thompson
Victor Julien
Jeff Lucovsky
frank honza
Ilya Bakhtin
Sascha Steinbiss
Shivani Bhardwaj
Victor Julien
Konstantin Klinger
Giuseppe Longo
Pierre Chifflier
Jason Ish