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depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

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[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
Add crosjobs to cipd_manifest BUG=chromium:973247 Change-Id: I8be6386fc3ab9ce6e8d9558862dfd0a7c74a5e6d Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1743018 Commit-Queue: Yaakov Shaul <yshaul@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
chromiumos/infra/crosjobs/linux-amd64
git_revision:ed616d595eb7241d39d34907050d2949121d6ae8
_vAeU0Q9lAxn933K8vDhwGK40zKVvV-yXGpIy43ATXAC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/goma/client/linux-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=201 https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/goma/client/+/80401d72a6476494ab19ac9bed48a6cccbd6f8e0 Bug: b/156993891 Change-Id: Ia66e682ac8c86fbc766a281e948073a5a56f23b1 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2224616 Reviewed-by: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Reviewed-by: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:80401d72a6476494ab19ac9bed48a6cccbd6f8e0
ssCLQ9mpqtBp2LLWuaCXSWmaUFW6BRRkh-gT4Wln35IC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/goma/client/mac-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=201 https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/goma/client/+/80401d72a6476494ab19ac9bed48a6cccbd6f8e0 Bug: b/156993891 Change-Id: Ia66e682ac8c86fbc766a281e948073a5a56f23b1 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2224616 Reviewed-by: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Reviewed-by: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:80401d72a6476494ab19ac9bed48a6cccbd6f8e0
Vxub_9WX5Y3YV7QUw_ftf7CMRvMOFR4OPW5cdkMKaWMC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/goma/client/windows-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=201 https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/goma/client/+/80401d72a6476494ab19ac9bed48a6cccbd6f8e0 Bug: b/156993891 Change-Id: Ia66e682ac8c86fbc766a281e948073a5a56f23b1 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2224616 Reviewed-by: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Reviewed-by: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:80401d72a6476494ab19ac9bed48a6cccbd6f8e0
pxseN6XhR76Sf-66oGcdViUcorgN82FQR5fiRVsZeSoC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
5 years ago
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-386
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
J5btoZe6GfEP0Hy9vMtj4rmTQilzolqrZ7aqK1Y_QckC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-amd64
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
jrO0pOGQSdyF_jWqUxcgVE531a9H1SsuSTw9jlojsn8C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-arm64
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
wRwA2TNla-2LJenE7mHPBrV3Kcwj04CX5-oc9zlDeeoC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-armv6l
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
0ijMFI1_FW8a6G4Xrc-zh9uuvQ3IeI8dP0yv_7swYz0C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
mRyZp56Pu4nCZGeUU65y3cAQZs8h1R0kgKyp17liWoAC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64le
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
c-BV6nIrDgGtGTX03KMFc9RCPL-xOzct6ZmOwG2Wqk4C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mipsle
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
Cmk9y1QonWqEe4mMoayA8YqO8kY3q4Awt6xdlI7_vwwC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
BXizEP9CS10ANi96CMXnamY0XcCbFnCOt20OxO0y6H4C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64le
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
XC-G_73HQVPqW3_hFja8AIWWXWRkMkj4aw_0Sa9taGUC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-s390x
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
IWenYb1xc5X-0ZiSKAYDgYtujnWu6fW4IjzVz8Qc-WEC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/mac-amd64
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
x9hqlcaY_WG_cCnbx5VYEenp650kO69MjTV49fMS_nwC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-386
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
hdf7eGxYJbQdqVwxfKtEASHzRLwHQQVUzk7DcpMkUdEC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-amd64
Roll bb tool to @ 616b3dd4 Old revision: f82f4f39 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/f82f4f39..616b3dd4 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/e79b7edf..d1ad596d Bug: 1081075 Change-Id: Ice734c5bb1c65d833651f2db3307e41a9eaba553 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2219273 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:616b3dd4ae6ab7225f2f2cad6e45e16030ffa6e8
-1yA0NYNAHoAqSImpTCU2vUQB1n8GSu8Fwfg067pwAMC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
-m2PUUpfbRxMfOwF0sHs1U4ZmtJ1uBfN2A9uxGhVqhQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
yODS32WeV82_sQvaywXjcNSB92IcECiA_u3BUIhBn3kC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
syvAlbbYzFC7-dUlIOUQ-B1wczrPtwaY4HU0VSunvKoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
pZAm4TnZlfRAYeqlkPRb-UWx9LoQpPVsgLTew8qPhp8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
0fPKbUxR4KQ7U1SNGA0P3_2g0wUPNt0lpFj1GuGFj7QC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
Oo77_B32HSGLLjKwZskyjMSRjVlPEcKzltErUs8sKKUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
ov-l0q1ssZQJz8EmDJiUvg77vmFhMq5xWl4YhBT9oeIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
N4WiYHHCRpRIRrjbg82MH6ffNf7qcQ12OMZB0b9WuBYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
NwsYOCdBtoBpEt0jA_LRHA6tx7SR8fhIIwJXUJrkps8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
ENa1tYhCzDwaN-x9lbuPMTxi3x-gc6vsvCG7ewiBf9UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
zUWOs52o-5_C20dLSqZSa56ltNPcbPWqoGJ3CS9lNFEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-386
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
qBSFBGah-oyPDnFOlqGVNN4cwAHt36fARBO26e6e7bcC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
[luci-auth] Update to the latest version. Has support for generating tokens through LUCI Token Server. Has somewhat nicer UX around `luci-auth context` usage. R=iannucci@chromium.org BUG=1082960 Change-Id: I2a77649b7ebbc5c99af4435afa929022a0e93ddb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2216533 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:510e7187aa80b1b0d490f069437d119c28d1ea48
albPp3qknhTtut8iNFavhAJ845aNVhILyJhY3UdivngC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
Wb-UzHaSuXpXMX3VKHqTvC_P2j0x4zsYgfx9_Kdr7YMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
S6tu9QI4bYBFe4j4i3QI00i9JLpKHBWmucJ_seIJgNMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
0eeoMVjVbfdYm4uyW-JkKguCuK3-QiQNcnXwXaoaCC8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
-_yXwuC3TcJ8IhdqYV-IkmI02NL09TzR8G1oM4JI4Z8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
ZJgKs3c2l-fIbc2vWHrI6DpCa1JQHHShfGWNS_cu9XgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
32Y8fe_HthSfFXgzSBh0FH6irH76jza5CaD562VqgY0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
aBo5IdmFlHJQGm2ppX8anK7cx09QPYdsZPMBvpD1ZWIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
dyXN_gzxiF5jUmSEkxk19wnNg6g-hf1yHmSIvdQTm3wC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
7SsUb6C9YRNPBvsr1OAb2u4rSBs5cynOUo3A-ZaJnp8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
ANVH75hP99gLlRHdMbeWQTQeCC9dtEh0K-EkkkHvjA0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
EL5KvwMyqovSi3KrIkKz-vMH-i3yo79bJj6R9GEgjoQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-386
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
nboOCaur_5hG1kIXJmLSNLCCTyTC8KPBpWqBGyS0l9YC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
[led] Update to latest version. This should resolve issues with kitchen tasks complaining about 'impossible' errors. R=yiwzhang@google.com Bug: 1015181 Change-Id: Idf8abea7b8585173b6609514a47c81ae00dc1935 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2223101 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:8c3d20797faece8cc28af33bb3dafaaaeee0a6e3
JLUtTdDbScBlEMBsm_SiSu9T6NkD0QrqKi6ERFG3oucC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
db7Rso05AQc28rBb8dz9Kilb28pn-LfiI8pZII59aZsC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
tDU-1v1sSNhz9l83U23FIQocX_1Hw_MP6Gufpj0XjkcC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
M0mvzxxC7Cvt8kn58nP5PXwLjqrKw4E4WJSxUgd3-GMC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
UWzqdqoQi0jnySjYf7l7RH_8j6yv72981PnNFbvCuxMC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
swUf5_sD6uqORVZQeO-DNEDCRPrWoohQ2kP72xYOLEsC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
nJ3mcsLqxwbjjfEHx94DK-p3DlOMF-chXWPrxTYyS0MC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
LBWFQlrIZr3myp2jIRZz8xlLbacFSbTwjn6ePl_-wVMC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
O7-PX3vGP7LJRNWLTFz_PJylkDAnKO5DwWTAYKiA5IUC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
7y1IDYlUiZxZfl7Ismv4PNc0Lz2ZE42oNYIgCPX_SakC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
9BTB952TiBXpmOyEVJ8HcgY4SHTH27ecyY0ynieZWRoC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
3tsAzGQGNxmJEA79FQCf62v2zJU3tiWWjorKDYxAFZsC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-386
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
dEajmoRIrlrXPthrS9OJf5v3ZBfY8cbIv5Mbpltrm1MC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
[lucicfg] Update to 1.15.0. Switches generated text protos to use {...} instead of <...>. No other observable changes. TBR=yiwzhang@google.com Change-Id: Ifcbb6f0ba891c23676bc1562fcf65aa54b00e9d6 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2235969 Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dd9d48bd236d1abcf276b70fe9749001cafdae1d
L8ATfsKDtEkPC9iM4VZAhppfIyG1BsPZBN9T7WfDmdIC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-386
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
b_yQiOho03hLW3u2EaIM770cNZUkGDID6L9R1UzA3NAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-amd64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
fI6WggdkRyN1r91MnTeApc2_gyTtXfYpueHZVLcaF8gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-arm64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
KTXfqwOx-7vF-latasoNKn2BBMYj93pSpoVyUjBxR4kC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-armv6l
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
iV_U4ATZiRqL-kn-bHlIXuN0HbesE3JldX0jjtcML94C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
HFWsUs5joBzipZoikQC49pm0HGIdohf54Z1NN65h2JYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64le
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
MmWAsc-Z93O4YndQUeswJkqe0V2Lzp0EUlIfIyjkGNIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mipsle
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
STZiSoEkTORWE9DuC27kz3LHnE7tmJeHb8_I-91QApIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
PsNbigRhVEYIafrrrVukgRpGxHjHvN0QsL72sXGJjHMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64le
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
pJVe9UUqCOvCQY5pwSCZlOD1_idrn-XAZWbYm_rwF-AC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-s390x
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
5Ys59es6eOo03NAAqwyEgZ1s2nhKlQaq9-QSt_RJ-OMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-amd64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
jakO2il23U4ddld6XjrM6dUMF7PYkcs-ywOo5pNoSCgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-386
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
cU2aFKU6dgPd2SdVFZGIcJui8Dxi_cgp51b377GaZo8C
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-amd64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
2cMbWqqVeig2-7NiGNCCdm0PVZ7Pqve0l7SYcSYVQqgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
Pin mac_toolchain to 9a1adc55bf4a1173784da3ba2f8cb06421606748 Bug:978867 Change-Id: I92bdef0d5871354a442947fbf74614ce0d896aae Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1859896 Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Lindsay Pasricha <lindsayw@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:9a1adc55bf4a1173784da3ba2f8cb06421606748
RiLbLddPgcxbnzu6nBOHc6RWmP6zO6vWQtWr9zoW2qQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
uljBrvEEopZNL4_cQXJhe1zwMJRuO34AZi4j-IRMeO4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
iV6F48NL7KbZv1P3skCEkqi1uSkw7_C6XtXRD-pVIYgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
UDiuICqa_7AV1ug01OH-BtnLOTCLPRkxUap7c4_F-2IC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
1mfP1cFhmVmyrH8EVtj_kRmuoupEA8XLOVIE58N43JIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
eibJ8LnvqybmO2Bah7Vbgo-_UKJdvM1jBYIEo9dqK1oC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
GltwKuT_mgYn2t9RKzaUCjyPft-GPS4F61c-tkhfgUQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
LIn2JHXmlgD8JlNQEvft9fiXpd4332CTNLY-3QlwnbwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
zgS4PNs-qrVXr6sqSx6vluJfBugcEq6IAU7RNpuG9qoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
0ltgT79UTpdCLznCJU60laegoRBobMTalPEr1quutbQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
0PFXoAorrEQtulgnLgfcPsTzlsBR09d3sJZn27x_XmkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
J8Vc2hyZPcFUOX67nSyl-1EOCn0t75LeN8e7jrGxxpAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-386
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
K30BBGLyKE0c5Q62sM7Wc4tDjuRVTFEf_RY0vhRkewwC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
Roll prpc and rdb tools to the latest version R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I8a0df0566e174e9d688daf8ba3ed4172c90a2af3 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2220784 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:dace3c38ddbc95ee87f77f6fac1d30b8333283e4
zniiDCa2RQN-VUlZl7UPRmipTkL4oRQTaJV8TGzuKKQC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-386
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
n-Rzivz-g3E5YQvvz8rpylWjpl6PU5S2oxiNvFWQbiMC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-amd64
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
o_pakcWW_bF9_EaJSArKwZx7HMcPYZ5x1XQIzzG4RFEC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-arm64
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
lEQODf-gYP8qFw8zANnvv0mBTpKADsgFDbXwjEju8MgC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-armv6l
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
2xJ7payhMC-5BlFbaCfFgQhl_SbZhudcPNcKPrAibvAC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
rvn-7nO9T30supwYw7fBjg0ePTscmbSL42-Q1dk5JL8C
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64le
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
whFd5Le1UkbbEkBUS-sS6XQAzfhtRWnGF6aCcGd_UbAC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mipsle
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
c9nBkhpx6FgteDizlJNQ7qjDrxZkmDH_lMbeg_ihqi0C
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-ppc64
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
Lm0wl9X114yo_stxeE6J1AAd72_O9NgXe1luGz5UxxsC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-ppc64le
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
PHjL981yuonoKP9KL31nvXBp21HHFnZVlPmu-erMArMC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-s390x
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
QxJgb0embFpqaVG8nDy77qMVLYJ2s9bcO8MxoZpVpO0C
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/mac-amd64
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
1KNSHBFyFWqXHBahjvFchcF--VqEAPhh6xqFeZ__i2wC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/windows-386
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
OmurydhXIonR9GckVG707GvmQtYsopXJj7a4M4FqwfkC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/windows-amd64
Roll rdb binary This picks up quite a few bugfixes, but primarily this CL https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/2244467 Change-Id: I1af9af4c53e23346844df5949b5dd3314da106ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2245805 Reviewed-by: Chan Li <chanli@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:a04c20f340d3172d2296fd1f76261d2076d6d3e5
cwLpKTuMasG2p1tQnAwLTBDpJ-1lJ7ihZfvrlY0RjEoC