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depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

615 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext

[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-386
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
v6CYB8RzpFnZa-JtmlovA4G_S_AH2IKLD91FIvVTGm8C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-amd64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
SrO0NN7T0OemJzbqYpUPssGADBxeoZRB2RjZ3kIPHhcC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-arm64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
UYQuQipl03aprDgHCoAx1eItoZjSTsalq9JU2AZ8_R0C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-armv6l
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
SQ_EQ8imrnnxJF-LNJKFnmSY8RoJanpM8YDMUmjKzS0C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mips64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
buLbinLw6vPsHKtlvIn9QGFwiQOLScRR-wlJ25pgT3AC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mips64le
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
psyuGhztgLaSqqq5Ai2_kgCH_0UBgxJio14WcpvcKG8C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mipsle
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
zHueOc4h7m8GK-OjSfTw7EW9X0AuJ7C62PD-_mkfsuQC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-ppc64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
rOdRmyY-FgNzHvqLXhAKY6QBrsCw_fmTdSu3-I_2ES4C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
cWJleDYXtjMmt3ZuiRaxbZMaZxYbu6CZO7qwfjaIv3EC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-riscv64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
RH3voLNllEJbEmupuWK562yGGqEz-sDeHSxYiKwoEDsC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-s390x
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
465hA6m0IZep_ClEym2w9qYirDFI1EkfK1rcafS_PpsC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/mac-amd64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
Zz0wed1n2BwNnt0QFLYDWWMDvxchZ1yTyhmtINShQKgC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/mac-arm64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
QRLDycqZYngnYpWNrQ1MtQ7WkfRyIX-NPnrTLyXLMv8C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/windows-amd64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
WoH3vY8VVj00y1B1iVVcJpBpap38S7qaF5qLutYm5uUC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/windows-arm64
git_revision:82a1d15d3ee4be12008c2df875e64b0abdffa6b9
SW0NruSy3THmdFZqwgF8hkDp4Wkmwhx-UIDpIpCADfEC
infra/rbe/client/linux-amd64
re_client_version:0.124.1.13f78cc-gomaip
LCOZhNACP54nV-xYsKIGGOzlFnVyacNwmv4YzqxxgOYC
infra/tools/bb/linux-386
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
yiJr8lH3KLW0ZjKT0qHm-0fCqd2neb2Dr5JnJnC9C9EC
infra/tools/bb/linux-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
g9_8XKp7dYIhb6RTo0cLmBD3qUdJC5HiDnvDYurjEPoC
infra/tools/bb/linux-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
22Ti2jNPotPfoxSfBRRWGS3ad-jumE_lAygunD6bmRcC
infra/tools/bb/linux-armv6l
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
iVoj2EzPJOkgA0-ckF_p4R-gS14-saWArWxQvMJayQcC
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
BrC34Gwm0_TEG2SqSTkuS6S24KWTKdFtR7YuWQyIAU0C
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64le
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
qHNcbaBX9TacxZImalIElcA0ytDa4V0Y5PA5iJ-LzVEC
infra/tools/bb/linux-mipsle
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
ZMUTI1dXHoPU89H6gxsg09K4VyzExN8kJtjPUx5JeAIC
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
ihOebjHEsKWBf41Aikr_lpLCm7E3F-wVYtUV0osKkJoC
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64le
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
ev7R4bSLa_cWMNXWEV8MEIqC7eTO_YB-h6w-oYjnnWgC
infra/tools/bb/linux-riscv64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
Jz1G-nidN-am8G6MDiAcDycLWa6TRYF-bCsJZZbiZL8C
infra/tools/bb/linux-s390x
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
5xu5X6lTUG1m46w0_Itxr2DgtvdOwXLW1wZSLd0_IJ0C
infra/tools/bb/mac-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
XmLJZCVNKncg3VTaW1lxSL-d9nojhDjx_z2_xNlk7_wC
infra/tools/bb/mac-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
tRCaaxHSw8jKuFNxK3tsoAM6vjtFHMwLFWwnuPxKZL4C
infra/tools/bb/windows-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
Cd8jY9RfUux7NyQjus0EEpdXcPAk9aZus3R6ZHRknd0C
infra/tools/bb/windows-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
YIKgJKFhYiMi5RoSHjoaKJS_sQeZEjdaqjaJn7ObR7MC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-386
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
PyVCCOtjCLqkqjlSH3sXzB0F4zsaNUZBepgYbXqZX9QC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
_3DNyCax5BvTv4gO5aOaR0GNW1RQ-Y_QtWd-MU1lvrEC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
pcffK_YQZSH3XKbwSgYKwiQYI_z55K_odVkHtg9_yA0C
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-armv6l
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
gABhiFSBTQHsi9lNaTDDCGfTAISvlGHjQ-ecYe1NQ7oC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-mips64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
3rwdegUpO6HZGDMPKQQeVGaZnTRvWVXpjM-FWwM1da4C
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-mips64le
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
FakSPOs4EgyFq20SQ455jkbYV5WCCCuuLRvuXZnGmnUC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-mipsle
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
SX90uWFO4AVyQPSAyPOpVZXYEQynfAGIz_uBavUOBQAC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-ppc64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
rX3uicJZo6J_vQjHhNtw6nCD-nJHNDteQpYNq5yWfNAC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-ppc64le
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
j4c-oDViLk-VOH9LpqpvqmNci5f8d66pMlIO4KGKgFwC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-riscv64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
Z1f_i0x8ukuyZI3eofd2PiekFFox5wcV8huILx-InfkC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-s390x
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
7rE0du_AaVXGRoDNZpglby8amJoUFvyKv9rVLVCQF7sC
infra/tools/dirmd/mac-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
K4zolks-ECecFVCzvIL0J0XCCr-jICdYCs8-l1DpLwgC
infra/tools/dirmd/mac-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
nFdzf1sOtHpv8yaKaNRwpGOwppbfyJ_HhDUtpP3obY4C
infra/tools/dirmd/windows-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
khmg6CfaTzpkScGv3kk3aMFucyySJ6zUX2xaNGEceMQC
infra/tools/dirmd/windows-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
l-XFRTD0TFZXTGo6Rm8CdUxyDT8HQkuMJtCbgx7G_7MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
PIcR6De29OE11sUjmc1yq7AAk7QhpatAmxEulSjXJscC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
37E30bs0e2cX7clxeoe4GOVVz_PGXWLsMtawMfewMf0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
ylz9nOpai6N55aYyGjh-N9fz0Zvz3G5QShsIPgYasIwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
ZEHopYtINOyBT8dsXuGOo6FvO8gHkpRPFrzUKQJy9KoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
I6Nl-q5dyljkIGqYIdJa694sdHW9ggz9VPoxv9nFBSMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
2-18TP7neRyf6A1QxYP8MknP7Y5v2rX2YibB0bRXIGoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
_VzOCfW1s9gGVf9xDqdVqwDdAnW4ltKxItu_9DDm1NgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
tFBCzs1BZNMGfMO9sKZb4UqVyU5NyHguFgaTQcsqmFoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
6MwKFGGZKCxdx3HSf3uZtdRUaPV32PPChAR_rK-8_5AC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-riscv64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
14BoLzCXvCljIktu9nTRr1du37eFzEKCovl0wrWCrw4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
uqi_emg4Ewb63v8bV54rgClK8sJVtbnMr1B4hQCvr2AC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
vWU8QHuqHms4O_UozuhXI8XTT_rsvaPM-9vi7722E2AC
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-arm64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
z4p8Qx-boxauyeFbtHJmXQlOtBcO_dgN7hgJDwHBD50C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
QoDZbOwt4o_k_E6qRe6Ceo8X8CEZ0YkhxlOO3kemGYUC
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-arm64
git_revision:3cfe24b006df32bd8a51dbe5c6f3c7cdfc066de8
Gfyt2uAXxrqedM9CvwiUSTe93wP1sPZeio8hDTDGwfUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-386
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
8G8UwKCL_C0K9KFC7BTIP7p4mq4_zLYmR4VWCX8fFEQC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-amd64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
-AzgOvRnTysbdgZpy43Ka86jKSHA9wwDqb0PJ-sy1u8C
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-arm64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
xKS_rZnWReWVxw0W6fnfZ0FMTcrkXGw12aaRWqlSP8AC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-armv6l
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
SWty1kMHU12FyFtVTBTNaWyD6kGGJXTZEw0dc7uRQp0C
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-mips64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
X59By5z7Y-qYEjcnvcxHKi9FG2QY132K0Qf7NO6G4r8C
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-mips64le
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
7-qH-dhi-hCINHnxty0MNYHp9hBkg3OoPRBanapOuF0C
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-mipsle
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
gvAyqrD6VyKILrkFn5h7iVaa9OnpCQKEmKEQM_921jIC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-ppc64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
o06sXp8FEq-kwkohSZaGmVSrBy7JzR8uvOV8kRzXr5gC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
7fP6t5O3NpRGOo1FYCvVQTL6LPU5IRaZjJ1Z_rt4tYwC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-riscv64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
umt63SbCBW6SayU6u9pEgUW8y01Un3n2vWKs1_OLKPoC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/linux-s390x
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
7kmEfNgxHxyQPgrHMZ1-ez0MqrE0VD2D9GNECowhCrcC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/mac-amd64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
ZPAfU-UsoK9od1t-IniA_TS_FbOxxZZd3w6peJPC7VEC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/mac-arm64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
b_7J79_jJAuEOTc2-yJr685iL6cxQPFAwpvUF67_YR0C
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/windows-amd64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
iCQ1ycx9rUTUBLamgYQNAVjLKluRIGBJxYk-HS_bPQgC
infra/tools/luci/git-credential-luci/windows-arm64
git_revision:fad062d39eaf922fe3bc5116e8039763c4530344
un7Gnso78zKNS4OBZpO4NQwg-diPIux4SaqFKb_dBLMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
Un-o2eFc2TtJ9BMNNbnLgcBntYtDTivWl4shdKyPaYMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
gq-c4TN5RYFgnLt5womn7ZnixE629ARdl2GafsQ0V2gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
PxcHq0WwuIxlwz97-1W1Xs1Dn5qv5c-mGirU5iwUyksC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
YQb5RTBEvM1QiPbHKnIA7_0hAnoEL9qUFy24WP78NIwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
DqxH1Svvv0WSCSvgrHKSy_ii-Ook8z_dc1pvR_P5XZsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
ZpKFcxlHpRCcKyVRC_zupMxrtNZ756JD_cMcFUjCSEwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
81YCYBkAoFBIKCrCHQClZ0j7PAKTg7g6bLINQV2NdR0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
NSEoNU94xNsJSPOcdAuXuMDaJPYjb3JJVARyT8Ef8GMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
jtwqCXd3Ohi9wwYg3o29aveDK0TfxetUCppLeIvQVoYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-riscv64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
2LveSDWx2cgzhSw318Z_VUI8lsTYbk0QvcZVkiz36T4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
M92Iz-LOG3fmbJYIBCnvUuV597RioVlPStSk33zpkdwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
MBE_0hZcHUmSaIeanPUnPl3jiw6ysPJfjldvMXkDfvMC
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-arm64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
iLVj1ljpNnFuuaD0U69UfGstIw-qaFC5Vah2D2OSt4wC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
R0WJz7c5pmlP9dh7mHALwQkPf8t6O4UwmctwT7-4ur8C
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-arm64
git_revision:a095a06b3c202445e01b75d5690a8587cbc3ab7d
NgR0T5fKqCuv3xVEXknq9ajfFuMJm4x4f9RZz1fnT9MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
35DcpM2_AKP4sOOqxggMlLGbmykVAzuxjNDL7uzY7X0C
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
j7KsdcuJfpYg2NHo6-5Z3bmScUTnXh_StE6jBp8R2cwC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
HrGhAjf-Ywo496RLhHmQd9vXYdFwetmX7L0c6FUFbcYC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
eAFuDH546SzSy73z8n_0DPBpUrNU2w_6BDdpYf30iGsC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
pi_Eb9RJGO0LpYWI7QEv7WYwemfb61H0RWvnRRzwaaIC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
k8X95-i5TGbC4G6icKKM9sauSZBZICIh-QQgPUer4IIC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
MQBs5Wen19VTEU9uEHIxkZTbH3sL014VYS9YWXmuJVMC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
qYP-z2kPF6VJWRxDG7V7aFVKpGbBGCtwys2qOwJI3XgC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
nvCH9otADqioD4hUb-ZlcHYWgJR5VZSouK0ktgODyoIC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-riscv64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
0M8BdwT6yGcuz80MAVUoKNcKAKpWGs5phjGZLCRypIUC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
0AhRM8uG0a63aeptpYCBP5Ojh0MhkAJW66ys0L3vWUMC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
GnaP6yZpNVNr1l2qpcP17LKLV--WkZjgoS3lwVrq3g8C
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-arm64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
AsrmLIm_C_XmDxskAxGoe4ElRGT3-9c9IaRja5GQcGYC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
t4xjqHh59H_EFhgEEecQrVarrofs-JwR7Me_UskC24QC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-arm64
git_revision:eb1acfb1fe32535c85f2ba09cba7990ddb53be0e
9Dy-OqKwFpS3iV1i0jsiMg2ex0LBWg3jk-9ZfkdyU2oC
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-386
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
KOqYfuotpAKLMtqVzaq_OThNQd3jv6kzfje0i_0PAW4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-amd64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
cVyqqGn3KKk68ZJ_RBPCh7HJ30QFB-5oynhCpBqv3e8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-arm64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
MKcYxVqRjFaqVkhsaSSG1ZDTR1KZFnoFqU1la0DwtGkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-armv6l
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
OkWsKpzbZrp-g5ZweghF6eYmW_pRvt3rwY177lnv_4EC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-mips64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
FEJdx9iPitA8OELKTp447CV15c87jvW13IE3X5ku-VIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-mips64le
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
HaZ07rukUOD0XIC8BzDO6UElAHlnt9GoJiKUDnFCdbAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-mipsle
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
ngL8QdYhXKY0T971_uIayyqDoVgXkyIUGn1_XH2x1lAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-ppc64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
de9kzjp_f_l2l8k8NIZ-8wENOD2wnY5mbuon7iNbOsgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
1hf_0x7pYYqUEtV3epA4lxyXER3MHmqexkZ7bc0QXPIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-riscv64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
42e-9Bu_gEsKxJU9W8DNlJI4sOTDw2kZ4zRr3cjkSUkC
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/linux-s390x
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
G_xu-Y97FN_30TkdKMbm3javlcOhCsX1UOrSO31dk3QC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/mac-amd64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
Vbmtq8x8KVc110V5VAOmJ0WTrhS1ru-zW7Kknb34M1kC
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/mac-arm64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
jwJt0ERcQo_ygd6nFqYlR2rU_qxy8t5HjxNZs_gemMUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/windows-amd64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
TeiVPgchvRPmFPH27ldu8-DwGRcLAbL2u2gK-QbGzv4C
infra/tools/luci/vpython3/windows-arm64
git_revision:ad0c4b622c7d4cee870f57eed8170c059ca42ed3
Wy7qpMUU1Uk5vkUF7lADS0ZG3KlApHiT1yJiR5KzDyUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
git_revision:59b5b4b5a506dc23eae31ef0f5b168281c6521da
Ak1ZLsVRHWHkhwru2lnp2ejrXhQqJkdlnDEJDCfiwZsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-arm64
git_revision:59b5b4b5a506dc23eae31ef0f5b168281c6521da
MldbVa5LExkRejzPaYi3OiM83XwHlw5PG18SL1n9baIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
APyLAGkA_BAt4lmb_kq7Hj8fCTE9SJFk9Hp414qVGcwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
VuaRWeThLLDus9YeoCW0xzaNhTwQRc1WzgzCaV931TgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
6_YeWNj-iRqHV-WWn1Ga8JVS4J8ixoKWFGTzFpCAtjcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
ahCG0jz5KkvQOGlwpJVt6FyPwId0_xVRPKWr6TmSZqAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
DZOL7IFR6HHTGnxT3qqQMrfGW7dT8B7JqHSWtLJuf4QC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
3-tPfIT3tMF0jeKQ0awLvu4yIsGcQmil6GnaeMl7r7MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
WxQETMJiTiSwGAgj0ZGdp0dbmLFXkEf18Z0bDBSBtuUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
vJdFyqoAtBcp5WgiVbYJP7nT0r5ClXSrAinT9ElsB_0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
lACnxgQHFV9umZR6o2Y_7TMMCeVbpVhFnl0oFLddcT8C
infra/tools/prpc/linux-riscv64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
Z4w779cEIbg6NPvh-kXY-6dFRjouymgqIVqSkUTYNIgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
Pk90dc-6W9qesmspygfrgYN3tInYQj7pU81lm0HLO8MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
LqnYGwa_zU-l4kSk7NfhnnozyYfX_Ilz-GiS3DBwFbwC
infra/tools/prpc/mac-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
k9RdZzT9-VLFqW2e9MhYk8XO4Quu58iy6EsayNxrF6gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
_B0-r7kIudyXRHye2eULac1nO8g_Ouozfa8z-AoSUxAC
infra/tools/prpc/windows-arm64
[depot_tools] Roll everything. To ensure https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/5834682 is included via https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+/b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102. N.B. it is possible some of these don't include luci-auth code, I didn't check. Diffs: vpython: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/f7fecd758a887260d403361b70d6b9e83e0c84b0..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 led, prpc, luci-auth, git-credential-luci, bb, rdb: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/165155b778d099eae08fef14896e11140306c32b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 lucicfg: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/1fdeb2c6cc9a65c02570616b8619699cef40d07c..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 mac_toolchain: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/05fe195bf77656743f3daa99d463a794260b429b..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 dirmd: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/9558e2c2dc002209753b8e61b83c4a2c81361fbc..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 pinpoint: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra.git/+log/fc7aae42258c8c0d0e38a72989cacbd36de98cc7..b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102 BUG=b:349254870 Change-Id: I1a1c9fd7942d02f0fa07b1ba9d1a4dca77ad5219 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/5856168 Commit-Queue: Patrick Meiring <meiring@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
1 year ago
git_revision:b1f414539ac10cc67a0250890a38712cc06cf102
R01dVSR4U12GFBavSS6BK7pFsOWRbgv0d7QD5PzCBQ4C
infra/tools/rdb/linux-386
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
NmXo-EvkeNCHtoIkOfHu0ax2TAyf5yHxLCeZPtgFbVYC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-amd64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
GW6G0NgFtc6NZxbgGhorQYVtqHa0g03pmgEsdLcsUUkC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-arm64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
bhxy0e43-hEz6VxqH5FE9itOF-jfb7ztPf6unVK6MmoC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-armv6l
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
37dTTbZf97OrhaINJTXaEDuoFdCzp_o9CLFz4AqkBbEC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
YvxXJqTDVNviay1pOpW1tDTI_gmo7zZcFduTIlYJj9gC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64le
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
-7y8XxGelJZF4DhpAsNBvkeEAvkwlkNvglBoJjmMkjAC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mipsle
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
Tx3xwoW9ItTOkYsbFtT6eNVOm097Q7yDevlefRdgMTEC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-ppc64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
cgCd4Aw6i_jLuTG0pq2JtDromlajsRse8aR4r05ZoEoC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
blqff2_ecNNw9WP3kMiWJDgjSRna_20EMIsmLKaDoG0C
infra/tools/rdb/linux-riscv64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
R1tv64V5hihbstoiIVAgCH2dRCUbHu9KeTGE8LVjaCQC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-s390x
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
WT63xv9oSmuxM-rR0FmfE-kHU0w9vsR0itCthvEInNUC
infra/tools/rdb/mac-amd64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
6lw8Zf_TDnCz9BcJxY2SOhvVYkWPuHUhPPMmvsImYcYC
infra/tools/rdb/mac-arm64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
dSmoKoUdbyR4udqt78bDGDMr4LRzXeUwv25TPoWazJoC
infra/tools/rdb/windows-amd64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
SGK05zJP-QNCE0ATTb883vdFbx1S6pO2jBN6ZWJ5eHUC
infra/tools/rdb/windows-arm64
git_revision:962d2d09531737b7b6323bae032ba948e3601e4f
nlwz6gGucC4b6_kDFYYobPtX052jPfMYyrPTya7oWAYC