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depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

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[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
Add crosjobs to cipd_manifest BUG=chromium:973247 Change-Id: I8be6386fc3ab9ce6e8d9558862dfd0a7c74a5e6d Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1743018 Commit-Queue: Yaakov Shaul <yshaul@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
chromiumos/infra/crosjobs/linux-amd64
git_revision:ed616d595eb7241d39d34907050d2949121d6ae8
_vAeU0Q9lAxn933K8vDhwGK40zKVvV-yXGpIy43ATXAC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-386
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
Ebjauqd0o3KlNnOcHxG_IP-uZsOaRDndybE6ylUF4PIC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-amd64
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
eSYAlDJHtdOBQ0L2ItwQTg110ITohUsK4dl81b2bgiwC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-arm64
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
6kjGLZJiW2fuJOOrK9dnH9jaeV-ZKzdrexAvEIfXF5AC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-armv6l
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
yFXOGQR3AKpjQ2oxUybpeRPxwGn22480LR_Rbx6i9zYC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
dRcfv9O1g4-XWYr2wdmL5m1_kHm_7-FaHNZI91ksodkC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64le
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
DTkMKQOnE8C4r0xH9KVxFsvb5NB6JS5o6i-CdXPAf8UC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mipsle
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
6oJZm1xMht-W1aqbxT2o59nQvGmJcoK_P82KHVGuP7kC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
4vPKBYOZeVUX-wQv79fOc5hI3BsPkS7pYo2RmJX9AnMC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64le
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
RLeMwX5xQXSlAyMNqpeLbu_hK7Ho_Umn0aE4fe_hZ1EC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-s390x
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
_CHImfxmnD3BXKNDXdvD_S3CEIihrsMPxsg2ae-mGwAC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/mac-amd64
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
JYPUpVJfYLHlVRAdxEXQuLAe0oSLbsh6fGzksGnWrIEC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-386
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
5mpNAc7dYz5DOC-mYubACbyrqM8DnIpCMPle4XT9Rp0C
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-amd64
Release newest bb tool. Notably: * doesn't support luci migration host * supports swarming.parent_run_id. R=tikuta Bug: 1004140 Change-Id: Iffc5b418766c60a99b7b7ec5a5772703d0cc23a5 Recipe-Nontrivial-Roll: build Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1855369 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Takuto Ikuta <tikuta@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:bdbeaf7b6f457238c69f328bfc7684fc1f2a79e6
PMEgvSLvoPU8ztuXaFqt0I1cm1t5zoDWuRDspF77il0C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
8TWSqbfcomDrxK72OV-nPlCUsb58EiGmWPI7Ml3C1j4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
nVALr-QAQcGQzbeduXLm18hqyxFmi2NxfJ--3iW7BhUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
hV3ksc0ub0GrxOx8C4hMOfjswtKrdHYl8Svt6_1RrDgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
Qq9BPtwG3VKRHHwEwI2-8W8nPeyLeVL1Nvhw2uTG50gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
Arr-nYTrW89jp-E6g1NXpkZ2Er8q4CJm7A1Z6FnYcJIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
j65WEvX_eRsHFUZ8zAQDZF2eadCfdCp8RYgHQOm2_a0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
QXLayUV_TvsPU2ak8YFFH9yCN3y45HlYr_I_nN69JK4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
CrEGeZSEp8erFoF07WfO17_XLIgKGiCBr1HSsVpRGa0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
0rogC4GEIKSXnV8Na5fKIrDe8fsRF8Q4yTMNqdGMVCEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
3el1lBm8KsCamV8r8H2e052zg-Yf6t4pZdUzuyWRm44C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
9SZu6I4X6qu0mqPhjD2U7YmLk1SkPPh4x5hUhvIHTdUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-386
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
l3cXhvcusi9ypW-29WeabxvkEVjQ6p1Xwc80VfLTqNwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
GBs8p3OBQPPVvztd0oS5qFhvEy5JVvPZFnbod0DZ-FAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
gDmfjgb3BEflqEhO_krNIX8rHyHtYOG_646eyxJnkAgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
JfbZ84-030THccrx1bt76ttYLQdlGelcqbWRCWQhosIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
y-XGlsH7eLgByh1-a3FVavt1WWDxX3iISEPHhr3WoWcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
zhxsuiptydyslnQS1lNzB3jB1MkEZO_QVFaY90WSNOkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
xlU29rpn0g7UfFk7ApqwCL1y7-8mA-lnsRjvW_x4e30C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
GMr1ZNJXU7yGJeSDqTpjH9yHVgzzQedLQkJfOY9NfUoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
B5dmyOF2wpvsea4n7-lVeATe7uFYoERaD68qJkoKkSIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
Pohe6tmDwK4dKz1mXYMsm6qkzWZnfq4tpNK-qZ1w5BEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
zO3a5ZBM1B0uzNOWwRRYUe5C4St3AeuygH-sd5fxz5sC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
g8zcyLIRAUKaSx1XyHj5wF7lc2FaIhLHjfL6u-ywsfUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
LEZlk8BQ9q6ScJjVXRXBHTY9dMlYqmmvwJgH_L8ciycC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-386
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
33J-_RFWits3USHI4J65qENsjb0GO2NRt1WZNjnEPM8C
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
Lw3JGnXTz-SLluP-TO8fXuj8nSuHAbuHshy_jjQs0bsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
h54dt8IuHmagHu6SKEcdtChEawFBIm8m40PzUaITUB8C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
-dT0kf2C5Oxk5cHF7m-uRc-Kr8e3Cg2ioR88UxPz5_cC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
mtPXE6YLdG73c7U6zbPPxogruMMbKW5etUXpeyFgNL0C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
HvXuZe0vKaig9ehdydXhSTDnNh-_6r97auAeFNvu9_4C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
w9ff_H5rWCX2-Uno96mhh6dVYpRZdtCZle6oMDARN4YC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
knTtEQ_i1fGJL1hGbftDZpBeZGmuP91A-MFgz8biXMoC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
_9bhrh2KWWrUNeKqT7xTMwnpPfPe1D0XyAsx-arK-IwC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
F_4hblZQRoIqidZK4K10EG71YBJoPZAIK8I2GRNGsokC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
gL-mbKCHAGQKEAv9739NehFI7w-slgNPBSD_aiGSvoUC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
nEVuvcMN2R9fZjrq1X2sFlKhHO9OgU3OC0Br4Fr8AqoC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
BuzAGgYM-meRlOMSVeJFNsjHDR0AeUaI3aT2D8-a6X0C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-386
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
O9BhFKn1SXlpsuDlnVswYFQNlm4q5-_ZmCUatIh8bVYC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg to v1.8.6. This version can load external proto descriptors. No other significant changes. TBR=tandrii@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org BUG=986972 Change-Id: I26317512ffcee0a50e051032d30ec79bbd805644 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1778707 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:79dd13c2262d61758111e6d7205e44d94ef47fbc
plKp8PGs-lTnocE2Xrm9sHaw4PfV9Y70yn4OZSULs30C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-386
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
_QFAQsuYdC5gxkewm3kyn7uVX2d3yN3uwhHsv5Sfhz8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-amd64
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
XYVyPEMXa9mujkJAm9zVtrCZjwH8HeCWQ2V-rsX4cfsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-arm64
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
2czDjMzZ8CO_wUkQSbUzVYpIIlImwxHosMuM3_ElGq4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-armv6l
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
wnNC62KiTEf9hAUlvgyplG90JzGsckuu5nIjFv-1LOIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
HGKehSHP23TdXYrTXd4ZvVO9VC1wTR5BWsvCotcTNdMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64le
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
_wKtGHiVJboEczc_CzfizgR6wNr6EBwE8RSGbbYC3lUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mipsle
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
ZcjUyhapefCJDK44Dg2ZtD8S3n2uYJ44WXc0W8G2370C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
TFVy10cgzf2KhtuEIiCQ7VmJaz_zuPG1hTCjY1vtt8MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64le
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
rgnykdUeIV3k5WWZguGxqbxlliyIKgCraPv7UjL9KOAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-s390x
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
2E88PYFZqBas7fDQwh44elysDKrUVJ0XwG8xEgeDnsoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-amd64
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
o4zQ8L5AxEHiBkrHkzaC_COnp3Jgcf1zDvTCNSqaDN8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-386
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
OykuT4GhjAkfXOULX9orW_pQpPqXmII9KxSXlX9W1kcC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-amd64
vpython: new release 10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c. Picks up hopeful workarounds for failure to remove virtual env: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876802 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1876638 R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ib18180bf94651bdc5559d630021b05259651e242 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877348 Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:10e1d79ac9ced2b819221e06535f457093b2a14c
b_XN8vxix13LonRV_o_NNIvr00l5poh41_LRoUsyycEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
Pin mac_toolchain to 9a1adc55bf4a1173784da3ba2f8cb06421606748 Bug:978867 Change-Id: I92bdef0d5871354a442947fbf74614ce0d896aae Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1859896 Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Lindsay Pasricha <lindsayw@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:9a1adc55bf4a1173784da3ba2f8cb06421606748
RiLbLddPgcxbnzu6nBOHc6RWmP6zO6vWQtWr9zoW2qQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
tGUz4jW0Ade3imPLEFKRw_P4bjAS7bv5m2PlzVQ6jz8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
pExQS2vSbmaeBkZkdOavcI4eVXfEvox789FgQBPHsxIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
saOhcc1VfDbTUCoKjK8pySKKM7Iey3PBMnX-oo4Uu6UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
mgp4kRNoetXPvq-H537SBuI2-UbuX7DTEZoYvRhKmCsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
7ZJBF9a0cErmn8KtWNWr_sZzirXlrs_uDqy0pBG3eYQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
RSTGfX_zpPdAS-yB2dkffiB-rM6278zuDanNFXaOEscC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
AqDFThd6i2ZradBxxPgj8iSl1ZIHzFw6mClJ2fTSX9oC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
g5rarKCGPYw-711M2yaB1Jo4sRa9_YB26IKQoxtRE60C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
pqNZUNS0AOD30-ODWPT8H1ZM82pmjV5rZbvbhFnHXtsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
WKRLbWviTHeAaXMNXy4jNbX9mxMwOpX0I5ZHLOClD-QC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
C1jj72eXIs6P6BqI5JKCB7aWunWNwM8-0HoioGEbAc8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-386
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
jQzFRINB55LRit23_YVllNePCZscUR9iebEKbvIKB2UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
97GIuWDvHohWyH9KfvpdGiWqPa0MtD__ITW7-lXiNrEC