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depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

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[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
xAg3WX2ex3ULkoVUsbr6B65nuYnpWaFNu6BO6HhQ0sgC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
cexxITLLto0E5R-VwXpZWQUq1mXCXXGjGbew22M66cMC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
SZ5EOimriMpRBY4fGC_Rp3TV41sbgHzw9gjZYFmgV6UC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
oCC_oVAcUUKscPFq_kFjWxXYIVzjG-r0_DV_n3EohRsC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
_-5uoJFORdex2t1QyS_ihDb7lFQAz4DdROaPatVoI1IC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
bT5siMU35bfMAtjaUbQpg0o5EVi70sF9jNte-593-TcC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
AQ7Ka00m0aVQ_Gspqfj-PeNM4j2YhxYypnVmeDEA9UQC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
ELLeZLgltcdkFDgwRKKmp9WMo8buIsL3NdkWxtGQoH4C
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
wlj-VEzFtvkweSFQfq8HbyY0GJI3EJFMzlpKhHOzrcEC
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
_hVxrjyTUEQaqoe5ckdj4bNHZxbl6aC5whk8bgulzP8C
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
PloatKD-3d2iygSAaYo9jT6IO2C-wZvEqcto1vndsMoC
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-386
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
FNfv1qwbmJiKVnFezV75UpPm_UdPcMHEnY253OdijTEC
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
1Y3Hk3hG0yhvLiQc1_HxEr8CtFJTjv92JvyvxIpiiGIC
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
E3nKjerBG7RPqn_V4pl4F9wqt9R2J0ntU58AIV1mdLUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
RkivgmMiKP_FiVtOuXSNfGjUe4Wg7tzbni07rywc3P0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
JqcDQXOo5OqqOaWzsieLF8Q4trh94HX-ncCPdeF56-4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
pbLzbHfp6uh3_CUCRhuMHDthfStsJV0ckGBUwI6GMu0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
rpNv0pyjznrdSB9a3sFxfhHTLnYBIxu81e1IFkw_uooC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
keAFqKj0JgbdIT3_D3lZy9sYjQNTLZ47mFKTzIneBpIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
KM_4hA9f6a1SSvnf52f9_y2u8D_TNtUT9EoVya9HevsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
3CaLRWwsl8QVkGT_Dbzoxz80WgwnS1rI94f4seIfYsUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
bZ_h5guzYt_DlVrtJBdaUUkoia6bWad5ssJBkRNS3MIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
KCdUDG-JsOJ3XUAEs2G095a9v1YlpiDVc-R1ijB-jt4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
cXEA7R2NgGsLO_pLpW8XMQQm--YqBTO0Jva_JvjqahcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-386
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
_umapfpxREcopT8Y-x0J6hYSccuivkQseo5q9n6ysqMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
[led] Update to latest version cc015d890 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ 0d6874412..340fb1e12 (7 commits) 2378074b7 [led] Give auth-login advice everywhere we get an authClient. b48969046 Roll infra/go/src/go.chromium.org/luci/ e48c958d0..44257920e (6 commits) 072630eb2 [led] Edit the right properties instead of the old properties :) 1673f6db0 [led] Remove interface abstraction 44ab51ec6 [led] Remove support for rietveld URLs. R=nodir@chromium.org Change-Id: Ic4d4842722a63bbd2369feff8c7df722eab86865 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1474426 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:cc015d8903532826f4430b87501a3c542ef468ce
bwfeMWc-0fUjuG3mj-H2n0Ea9HrF_Y8gLQlA52WtNyUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
OpY4oBnEuqC8KDDvQnlxvT4PGdumw3JY_adHeitdy5YC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
bHwkDAKggM-YFzovyjQxAujnA37uweLX1YFKEviYIqEC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
EKrOZItRlqDwvt2ybNCQm9T8jT9kGi3G6GanAUWdOTkC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
fvbDVcUYcTb6WyPhCLG10FYRxifRPJ64ZwztUnd_K2UC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
AOP3zmAe6jyTDNvWSXgS0yX0VeoVqgWBcB25ck2svAwC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
VNix4g1KGQCNBxlLHdgkighR65mgb3lr0Y4CsCD4-ZAC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
nVVXThob5HGoQ1iFdIMgHy_fPyn0iYjuHepqDPeOh24C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
JAFKYuqFdD0SQkidiVo-hhd05jCRpyPtneOL3hzR-54C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
tFm0qB9BXL_MOMSmkYINlMC4eTmPVUvifmNAmQa2bqYC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
5CPb-ToC3zufxg927by16PDJLMILI1viHpzY5fE8uv0C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
EZ9iMHcQ4HukK05s4mAdPV0uvOwC5q0Z4ko6PdWHbCsC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-386
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
zZVsV-hC0P-1EiNDTah_i00MsOhRo3t9p2qS-69rqasC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
[lucicfg] Bump lucicfg version 1.2.0 -> 1.3.2. Change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/ea41200b..1d348dee/lucicfg R=tandrii@chromium.org CC=andrewlamb@google.com Change-Id: I37b8a33971348b24db53ddf384ec3f5d7088e283 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1483872 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:c2efbdb7b233d22dcc5196a4b992151953abe047
8MFmc6osj31ynx0Vrf1UqDPFHlx6SeRRTGuEXS2POdYC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-386
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
_XghQLpCauYSoYVMyCG2QsGAWPFR40gAI1d6ViNicWYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-amd64
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
ucaOciwAE9aweCUDOrmSvyiwrjmbywuB0NzAGUXIHjAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-arm64
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
OWIN1DWx9G0qqKXgYVlMkM9H-VU_VQYA0vocEFcCuRcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-armv6l
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
Rg6IkKVeR09IY0yGBlhuK3jf3YnglPbpThfR6mqq-rwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
IGAm1cfhi1VrOG7K_cXPOxM4fJWjcMJS6q2jSgxm1d8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64le
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
Rjn4KEBFquH55jhaZszLfAw1V8XlqKh-PLy-Yqv44e4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mipsle
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
UDwfezAV19wjJgC9CMQwJa5AlI8ZybWBes_xJm-e5iAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
liWMYGNyzC-jv-bdglNhPqvY0wSD0U4Fl14sT39ax-MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64le
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
-MmyGCT3WMS27V9mWCrGMDeog3-cYkY579W5xOhCFLAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-s390x
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
3iI0Un8ppWBfFBQrqIT08SXSYGxMavYmvIuaA4vZWVEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-amd64
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
yhDQeJa8hj64DkPAcLKVNQmNTgYsirl5_wvmnHvOz9cC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-386
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
YAQ_TOR4UzXv7K7imbeqe0hexj0EPUjtz21NvYCDBVIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-amd64
[vpython] Re-roll to pick up user differentiation of cached envs Now with correct error handling. R=nodir@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 869227 Change-Id: I961fd80209c9d9988e9d03016b7c0bd253c6cdfb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1347249 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:96f81e737868d43124b4661cf1c325296ca04944
EUJh_9q20TnqjtRumVX8fcDubyBDjOpzAl-sJSKGN2EC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
vNT-t_YkKEmj1dxZngt1gE8wkNrFxDkaI4qJlrmb6mUC
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
sgVa6Bqe47iNq_DUsB-lSCfxlou8r4uerxNg4umTO2EC
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
qIKuSNcuWDXDxEsV459Y9O38lFmjI0zSFf9fv8bCZ1cC
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
y1ZfMndSGAU0lvne0JdMz5lAmuPht63WBlTvOxPZgX0C
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
Uz6gU2q_O1scRPoXrRwrrS680hJKkzoUSeaWGNBBuscC
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
M1-JZBfVj4yGaBKDZDXtVs7zL1ZUKmTU--A1iHcfIl8C
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
nvFzHditASTC_uC5mpTBVJW8lNOr59xsOdZwMsDz-ssC
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
AGR2Viao8FsoJrhFN2FFT4JT-0owJmsnK3Co_GNh2lAC
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
UDHoL3Ay_TtgKL8i0gH8ct745FcejLx79OKEo-jdl34C
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
10EhRfS4lfa8Yzr5OuSstYJTyHMxBlbegU7FRYSE580C
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
ZCOvdJxiARghbyT99Cyk5QYRghgTzoXL03KG9UxILtoC
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
0O-YV-VdtsIyIvEcBluv6fW_qa_ZZ5t6_iod8vYcuhAC
infra/tools/prpc/windows-386
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
MbSykhR59B-iwL26ZhQfgYv8YgRJGA1179EDOICqrkIC
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
git_revision:9a931a5307c46b16b1c12e01e8239d4a73830b89
zHI_Z_f3YwKQPBNWMCPhmiqyxt_vROHZVCZjHKYRTvIC