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depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

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Plaintext

[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
chromiumos/infra/crosjobs/linux-amd64
git_revision:ed616d595eb7241d39d34907050d2949121d6ae8
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infra/3pp/tools/ninja/linux-amd64
version:2@1.8.2.chromium.3
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infra/3pp/tools/ninja/mac-amd64
version:2@1.8.2.chromium.3
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infra/3pp/tools/ninja/mac-arm64
version:2@1.8.2.chromium.3
nVO-Kzyky9nfG4pRb3Qo7KdxyoEXjdwuOhVwy-h0rbMC
infra/3pp/tools/ninja/windows-amd64
version:2@1.8.2.chromium.3
HLdWFKyFMpFQO3VFSps1gevQGwY95hEBUFblIfDux5QC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-386
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-armv6l
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mips64
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mips64le
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mipsle
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-ppc64
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-ppc64le
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-s390x
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/mac-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
QXeE7CCcFBqYj6wRgXoxwF7EReO8RGI0Ykyy9-RrvGIC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/mac-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
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infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/windows-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
hlKSh7FVQsL5gHDXcY5YjJ7wDIa9ZW8Ln5-TUgchmd0C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/windows-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
grRLh4CDzVQBWdB54xiWZMIVsQ0WGp0VdIfGpre0DzgC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/linux-amd64
git_revision:b493c375e7e891ed1eb4ddb4f8697df577fe2995
_wCBhXhNV4Zwaegv2ZWtv8kHlVdNWFp08uKVdLAaFdAC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/mac-amd64
git_revision:b493c375e7e891ed1eb4ddb4f8697df577fe2995
nE9vLiu336rHu5QHoeK9H-5IlG554juBEO70Di4BtZ0C
infra/goma/client/mac-arm64
git_revision:b493c375e7e891ed1eb4ddb4f8697df577fe2995
FRrdVdPVhcoJZVEu5PIAdNAFAFBlCmoEQ_qad4nmhGUC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/windows-amd64
git_revision:b493c375e7e891ed1eb4ddb4f8697df577fe2995
QIackRy9RePbN-44PAUxNCp1MgI-Uiu3IaL-m6D6Cd4C
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-386
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infra/tools/bb/linux-amd64
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infra/tools/bb/linux-arm64
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infra/tools/bb/linux-armv6l
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infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64
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infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64le
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infra/tools/bb/linux-mipsle
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infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64
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infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64le
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infra/tools/bb/linux-s390x
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infra/tools/bb/mac-amd64
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infra/tools/bb/mac-arm64
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infra/tools/bb/windows-amd64
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infra/tools/bb/windows-arm64
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infra/tools/dirmd/linux-386
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infra/tools/dirmd/linux-amd64
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infra/tools/dirmd/linux-arm64
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infra/tools/dirmd/linux-armv6l
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infra/tools/dirmd/linux-mips64
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infra/tools/dirmd/linux-mips64le
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infra/tools/dirmd/linux-ppc64
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infra/tools/dirmd/linux-s390x
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infra/tools/dirmd/mac-amd64
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infra/tools/dirmd/mac-arm64
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infra/tools/dirmd/windows-amd64
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lYYy3Dab8ID4DIS07-wJnbdi05N0QZOVNfuK6QDJAVkC
infra/tools/dirmd/windows-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
CoAQMhIaxyZIIC28OSkLhgUQ5nb3duR3qqE2zIkuywEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
YpQweCHVOmXrSkmEO6UeKq9powKQPafFd_xZI1DOVa4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
z0G9-JY0EO2Jm7rARIP-DAw_d_pVofosMFTFhsmcSnwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
4WMk1ODcWIqvFkzWjmltV7Dh2xrb2jCuOVydtByXvCMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
9nWO2aDAjvrRdldvvihegSulmqQaQn31wbxFcbshi4AC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
3nv5iiq5_QZd3S8lqMnauPxzK41p0aOxzko-UDvend4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
FF8DEmXcrfAl-FrT1TuoSCUOTWwZE2cQ0pXR5ffY-coC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
A-YQGABuDVgir5OZKeuUtxV7Tb6HauYLLNpwuBKLoG4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
QA2h7hFCCIMQpogFLo9_mwa2hpF-qqmsutQMCHcPmXoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
7f9wW6AHQq95FcdpvmZo6Y-CqLc1ZFfqEGYaZZELk9AC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
A8tng1_noLfOdRw2pJW_HHk-HBV0uyZLFPl5cpNKmb8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
CG7NlOjLL1Vm_5_dGVb1UHlk0ZmBEBPEM9l4hw4GKrwC
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
9RI8YWtWl9AGmFHjg_LCSykJmt8EOxjnHQl9Isuw4NgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
vnr1QAp8vUYKu_tuyNW4_cZZWbStq-9NX4JqMSEyJRcC
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
3g1eBtJpNxifhLSddADS9DVxQRVctVAObujwXmshY54C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
diWjyrmaLzExOjKMJoAOxKmbLPbMHtV3A4FmpBkX4hAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
66htq0QXzzEUpgPWJYJh8RcSUD_fBacBe6WoeNWlcREC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
esrLozfTb7QBcN5h7PmSKafinTbpWC7klz5oXlHGcyoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
QMLlhgZtIHK3Ltny-96D4ifORxOOgSf1gO9Yhc2TgjYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
4Pwo4wOKWg-1PlOsHvzZGG-vKbLqjihjy0c2iStcFGEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
nvK2XJ-WEM6Wg8kuaOq99ecrBWX9bxtDoOPVW-B6tIQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
pxnrNW4vExZu9j0s-Ptoc3g7-RXGIar-4rRRlyoFC4UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
JynbdShqALvAUaZISMlmZ8I_jj5zVC-Cr4iptAvHsOYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
Qupq0HcYaVWYLyZCuI2_yFtW1P6AN3R2Qn_YJTfw65gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
u3mJXTWjPL5Z-3_EEwAO6mMnNA6cU2xYcHeSpn4OfEAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
2nweWY_vUEc1wixPH7IROfs57_sTrkXx-frzHXD2oT4C
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
y1OJHj_sbXmoBFTZKGk_p4uVrg1Wd9g-4iDuv23f03MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
5rzNSLB5wgwsSjXa1W7VTdoH7XQqXiD_pz1kyzWg6YMC
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
rr03rcka9N7tcJk4FU9huhj_3OyA5KndQ8YuR-V22pIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
3uY7Eurt2mPgb3flE3ZYuXOYkwBwihEGAQZb-0mlnb4C
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
E1RbmLrLnptv-FOdCob1P44ZmG4yKTW3Xjpnn2qiu8sC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
QRpNuYHfWEQzhksT91TRl_QvpW58Me20MrC_4F3vCREC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
WHon7yCJkuHptIYftj0dLz5D6zsdjegi8MwbDDA2YLsC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
CJ1AmFFIPOqLrObSZW37CrW-fCcXZHKXH-UpIHw5sXIC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
AIBpmZ7A1-ROzHO9aNsbEBZkuxQGg_DB1dzpVmTJ_QYC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
Vd-AdzdCG4qsVXcaCZSPvzezjQ9HOzvPiPw0OV9SfpoC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
jk7_rAmS5W9jiW6PQulZ0CtUIXNezuWlmPpcg704Y4IC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
lbwpeRH0HYuK7nWmnkDSlFvxrg6-ByLo8Nu31bs88mcC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
uhoAo_pDWdMeQx8d09RHxrhxrdQDUha5KG2v3k0FzWoC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
hTDSnFAnzRPxxtmXZ0yopOzvxWOupQ0HDjMP6XV-gbIC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-arm64
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
tYCfNznVHLzZvGqveybvtWlioVSjQu4NwS4ZMH9-MOQC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
ewYXubyqlag83H7udtMDeD8J8nfor1vSLdNp4JQsXp4C
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-arm64
git_revision:dca1b4a6d6c11d64f3708a2e4af8d2a3f4e57c83
c_lWoNQ_PVyZSeM7WsENg4Ea8BlV3xvPxi9xiilYufIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-386
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
eGwM15U21ZJfAQUr3fwhBXJjbs0C9R5PhQ2s7ffJ5x4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-amd64
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
9yAXv0KsU9JAgagYQxkjWkU_YUDsDJpdQ4Rktg-EJDoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-arm64
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
caLUJKwXkeJqNbXe8VrUaJapyclM4Pi8UqrVMDYRvqMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-armv6l
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
4DqSKhlfFqV13-5gC0ocY9p6ywv-cJiL2NilLkppLiIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
N6eu72sj__hX71cv_zxtnmskb1JPT3H5peTA0A4hWQ4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64le
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
2fVbrtfqruPr0fCu6WzUd6F0ZzZOAeSewpvkvK9qvl0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mipsle
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
44Pd9YZvAOGgXkir4GV_3nfWF6DFFOx91y7hrdeKCpgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
2bF-o3-L4WWbUHR6SvsVUAq6X8ZcQvT0GD762sM2CYEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
5eTfzvKq0RH3XgWLuhKPyVFGwbYi3fWogKENRq2wx9MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-s390x
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
y8M08KKGmPcQtUc9O3ISZAvG0cXSDvevJrk59xhC9j0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-amd64
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
Jdog2fhqcbdX7c8uZTwC0ED0Z6Se8-Qj0IKZzzfkTqcC
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-arm64
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
5od2TokCifZKqqmc-6P-rVJHCbq9-3ogCbY8M3SRFooC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-amd64
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
nRUaJj85Xfp87bEW6FjXOde90sf-KhSbhL0b08ZDXU8C
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-arm64
git_revision:7db81fdd219325d5d11fdaf56357ec28c26fffb3
AHTqVMdkiBvkdKKoeo4Ib8z-ACkfIgRuKFos3WADrlAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
git_revision:febf962fa9e6f5cc5c4ce86e8dab6ff6d91088dc
QT5Z7SqtISM6t43Aq2EfIZhPsoltf4I3TL5_VjrhGmIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-arm64
git_revision:febf962fa9e6f5cc5c4ce86e8dab6ff6d91088dc
wN2a62YXBByoREz7owfdlpk47efG7dq43ApwhSYY9IkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
tjLmiTmKH3CQgyHYUpffhKuBjSgPL7Wtgo1QElWe3xwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
1daA634erHcfPCC3w2-YWCDNMj_i6WxKIMHAyR06bBkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
0xyn6ELqWyI_7eLg9Q7aEGZ0p1wEK95D8vO7dj_gE_wC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
wYIzsztnclU_LKHBfTcn9daypSfdCaq0fH22S6U2VdQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
BWP_WP-0Xa9YB67eNPPP0H3BDPKXa6HaAf4C1RO3KLAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
5uYRtgQiON9uoSg0bleX7TsdvgsI4iLrVaSEnSlRV7cC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
0ySypx28FtJooKe4236n93RAVdU2NmyBllsMrMYcnZsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
qgPz8DsWlotJSWmdM5YQQYKZPr2KRsDJAwFRmviJ6EQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
ZJEQ1WtBJwRtjF3WU3z3EGvhiH_ACxKXTxPyeFpKEDEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
SXOvREMHaD5eLdYWaJfYW8wv3wWZCVkEPGLiMWVZF5IC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
Am4xFw04qSa_UVMSA-WE9EeudA8_9Cs1lt-80K2cwywC
infra/tools/prpc/mac-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
K-fBxjXUjKLrMV3cqc8hrRpr7zvLX-iEN7igzZq4K0gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
eqxvBHyAjHaAqIpaKsbtsfOOtpWoGr3_9VQCckYOaiIC
infra/tools/prpc/windows-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
YZumboffAhxRLQfEOwv6uc8-j7U0WSX-96b7a2v_qRcC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-386
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
h2oQz4UDKxCg9Af_Xu7EEl7iY6dNW8uMwni9HuflB5EC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-amd64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
aDXfwGq6nieiN6q1ErKq1_7QKj1kPe9SbYua-dHDDWYC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-arm64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
6nzpibnRqUM0PNRCDtq4kKdtaNc1UXeQ6b7vBEMXkkMC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-armv6l
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
prYhJI6KMOhfCeoU8DbvK_a2-13fnWwb48oFNPVrXFEC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64
git_revision:7c22b5fdaf13b03ca7a8cf80fe02e625e555230e
4XEPn2TJg3Xqp9PZ1dNnOnxHY0DIppFItOnwG_mLoXgC
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infra/tools/rdb/mac-amd64
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