aiden
/
depot_tools
mirror of https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/tools/depot_tools
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
You cannot select more than 25 topics Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
main
chrome/4147
chrome/3987
chrome/3865
chrome/3904
infra/config
Branches Tags
${ item.name }
Create tag ${ searchTerm }
Create branch ${ searchTerm }
from '364640e249'
${ noResults }
depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

319 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
Raw Normal View History Unescape Escape

[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-386
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
FZtRS-P3M1rPkavd15dSn0Y6fEiPw7rXI9N1h59fNJQC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-amd64
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
My9cU9Gx_rQYusTjaYfgTLWuNH9eOwdgj7ESrgxW_K4C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-arm64
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
oDqJoNS9r1JF2J_tHp55kOOUhxCQSNBzMYPyR4ZLRUEC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-armv6l
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
4zUHjpNbKycWlnKxkd3xqYzthEtyNu90TZkRIrJcmCkC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
PDvcKdWxf9ON-00C6QQLNd-kxOy9kVnhTnTa50agfUcC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64le
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
Wz522X-p7oOoWufilPvMAQe8l4MxjBo--qeBesWMr98C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mipsle
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
lkYfJ68TkGQqE11GpSGN9fiMfJ1JgvHw-zKiDrGqN3cC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
ciNiveC-Ib0Zzogn5eipqjI_bYZYpDGEJw3ymWTq5EAC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64le
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
PIIQlT6K_RJlgFNq-fLSchx3yxArlIZzU99d8mNPp0IC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-s390x
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
GvLi8E3JuS7XA-wMwavI7XRy93lGIyD835VUKNeoHk4C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/mac-amd64
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
CLT_nPLrwKLSXmKjfFJcAwjTD_BOfFbCfWWZXEsaD_gC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-386
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
j4gmGfkKSd1UHMsEj5vu1Dd9arEePvYj0jwEwotUo1EC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-amd64
[bb] Roll to d0bb723b Primarily to pick up https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/infra/luci/luci-go/+/1600250 R=vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I01cc74af93b4044f2607d98e7889de7965eaf60b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1650505 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:d0bb723b707deed5f523ad688c63fd48429bb3ee
oYPjQ-PKX0kP6pENViWup1be5Gw6JLYu3YYp9YRXcgsC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
8TWSqbfcomDrxK72OV-nPlCUsb58EiGmWPI7Ml3C1j4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
nVALr-QAQcGQzbeduXLm18hqyxFmi2NxfJ--3iW7BhUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
hV3ksc0ub0GrxOx8C4hMOfjswtKrdHYl8Svt6_1RrDgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
Qq9BPtwG3VKRHHwEwI2-8W8nPeyLeVL1Nvhw2uTG50gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
Arr-nYTrW89jp-E6g1NXpkZ2Er8q4CJm7A1Z6FnYcJIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
j65WEvX_eRsHFUZ8zAQDZF2eadCfdCp8RYgHQOm2_a0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
QXLayUV_TvsPU2ak8YFFH9yCN3y45HlYr_I_nN69JK4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
CrEGeZSEp8erFoF07WfO17_XLIgKGiCBr1HSsVpRGa0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
0rogC4GEIKSXnV8Na5fKIrDe8fsRF8Q4yTMNqdGMVCEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
3el1lBm8KsCamV8r8H2e052zg-Yf6t4pZdUzuyWRm44C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
9SZu6I4X6qu0mqPhjD2U7YmLk1SkPPh4x5hUhvIHTdUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-386
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
l3cXhvcusi9ypW-29WeabxvkEVjQ6p1Xwc80VfLTqNwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
GBs8p3OBQPPVvztd0oS5qFhvEy5JVvPZFnbod0DZ-FAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
AarP2GPxHpP81bJOElE9kCu74L5371kLTVIPxjJbPe0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
-o8ipGy6evtmfklql8TMfBn9E2LvSJUlIm0NTy5xEjAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
mVCsY5VC7PojddKfeG9G969pDUeE8zUzNWx4MXgLElEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
m12D0T20WdtlWCykqXqCKbfHKpUs3sqscZGzAZPIPvIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
uyAJmnzQMZ8bcgV_tslIMowVB7APvyboFg7jclOkpwcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
IAdfi6fY4VyeCEukbPNES9qhQ7uaMaRFdlFuXl1NyyoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
hCCO7B9Q2tZZh5I3kxSnZbhuqgHN6m_ro9SXny8Aq0UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
2uXJIcL5KzoH5H3H012SIh5FsewTZjMNJdwWhCsCP7sC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
dIj_L5Kn7SnhUkShBgkGl4tXoHUYz5wl9J4chPCmCUgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
AGjKXrpWJOP2UtTr0iKYdVAXV_bgOVemef8ylfKhzsMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
dXON1fpZ9lri_QPhOEqJ_HwIgbY8H8NfjFnpHUWWzdoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-386
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
RE2OWuLUVW-CQWfBWnoyowucvWmmRk1_ZRfq9CExZVgC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
Roll led to latest version. Picks up some library fixes to allow `led get-swarm` to work correctly again. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Change-Id: I1f6870378224372eeba12cfabc9f9b002250b4ac Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1636276 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:6d8f5e1d5857481abe0ce48f972ab5421fe244be
dGqMQ4q4h-XVsocz3xSoNtm4IJIxG54QQlLO0NNBJNsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
RrUUbaExKGwHbiZd1BfKQNUa7gUCzkezFcOlovQ_mRQC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
fO5EH7yqQ63XNusV0xyD706ax3op8C-Bq3Xr5NQm7AYC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
rgeYiRL-IAFiEo5vlkfaNP-At1NasgrZAQXN6rodXxgC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
yY930SoQyXfJZTmJtvKfRvjizuwHowMBNQLJTzUrEogC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
wjBBIBFg-ZkghxjAo7mqF_ESWfoMrgyidWML1YMXg7UC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
XDJBKFccWdS9kWrqtShtfdzgSu29py3s6z7BJSF4UOMC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
lUW-0FRkEhD94n2gVnCA3whiVwOmmP6wCTQMpQqJIp0C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
PYgxQjXcX6vu74aoetShyQS2R7iHgoB5uB2K3TKkSM0C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
mRLu7VBH7oklb63vwm5QnxzJNSYRq6HNC_kYts646QAC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
Gxeu5kJhhyn3VPzdYAb6YEJf8TRyybTKPiGovLxQg0gC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
l91KpOLsaNt1G7RiWWBhuNhGEKAcWVOA6sjnx9xsG04C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-386
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
nkxpga-12UuEqstoiWlbgbUedTq12-xXlsRP94_9KwwC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
[lucicfg] Update to the latest version. Picks up various CrOS protos, no changes to lucicfg itself. R=tandrii@chromium.org, maruel@chromium.org Change-Id: If9edc69f628909ca46a8c38a80f824aca4911fc8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1696235 Reviewed-by: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:677b535a231b1ffc901bb8c3a4a77d8ddf768605
Za1gF4WHWBO-9H22lhkAo404iFHKDUj7r73fOnfNODwC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-386
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
wMuAVc7aZN1H6AeNJir5sHnQedTnYSxNC0xSZ7bhsAUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-amd64
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
d4cRoeyLHZhmoLnTQsjMhXfbN227X8cqTAZxORdIbesC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-arm64
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
Tu1dUIKzjard2qn2Uf4lM_xcKpuXcsHVZpmU6VofV50C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-armv6l
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
wXrus3zFcrTr2s4j6RYtRyY_3b_UCr8ZR9_HHanvJnIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
GITDTSLRm99lunYavGlofnYq-QO-AYtbxbl24k-Q44oC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64le
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
b5Urfr_luEPyzrHN_0A-oUS-1KVLNKKX1-f0jxe9LmMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mipsle
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
ES1ntb4yrlovrovoSSWwepJhrB9HL-oYBzfoBB7In_UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
JOHcDH4Tgwe5-KmqBYoyg7dbLMV1XT3Y18ocbBfW3i8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64le
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
CzyLXWHx_mMmh4U6yaeBV4g7X7b5IpliqyRo-gICMbYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-s390x
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
x0Wc1idq-TXTT7YRcMokr91Dls2SZbJkpYsb1EzGpdIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-amd64
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
Ua-1HtP3NobgI3GfEeGAGoRy45L6575VQ96M9SCV9mEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-386
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
Y7XBraus3dpohfR_o-YBfRHcjL1BKttkZEHh2MWwKV4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-amd64
Roll vpython. This picks up https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+/f6cef429871eee3be7c6903af88d3ee884eaf683 which should help developers who have multiple python installations on PTAH. R=tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 957291 Change-Id: I8b6c3c4efc16dc7c40d649fa177aa6c4014e8226 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1592101 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:7c436dff846e5ad40ead55e392ce03b701727b29
URdASxHunCnTpWYCexYLrUvW8ifbWByq9CG1epMe4j4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
Roll mac_toolchain to pick up -verbose. Bug: 962920 Change-Id: Ib52b4fb571381352b63a83ac4c4392ba20677892 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1612291 Auto-Submit: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:47354a337f7eb444f2cb1e1b5d30ac3940f1d097
qeuJWCEG8k8sDHF66tpTllhiWuGcl1m_TtpuhuwhrFsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
tGUz4jW0Ade3imPLEFKRw_P4bjAS7bv5m2PlzVQ6jz8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
pExQS2vSbmaeBkZkdOavcI4eVXfEvox789FgQBPHsxIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
saOhcc1VfDbTUCoKjK8pySKKM7Iey3PBMnX-oo4Uu6UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
mgp4kRNoetXPvq-H537SBuI2-UbuX7DTEZoYvRhKmCsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
7ZJBF9a0cErmn8KtWNWr_sZzirXlrs_uDqy0pBG3eYQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
RSTGfX_zpPdAS-yB2dkffiB-rM6278zuDanNFXaOEscC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
AqDFThd6i2ZradBxxPgj8iSl1ZIHzFw6mClJ2fTSX9oC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
g5rarKCGPYw-711M2yaB1Jo4sRa9_YB26IKQoxtRE60C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
pqNZUNS0AOD30-ODWPT8H1ZM82pmjV5rZbvbhFnHXtsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
WKRLbWviTHeAaXMNXy4jNbX9mxMwOpX0I5ZHLOClD-QC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
C1jj72eXIs6P6BqI5JKCB7aWunWNwM8-0HoioGEbAc8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-386
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
jQzFRINB55LRit23_YVllNePCZscUR9iebEKbvIKB2UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
97GIuWDvHohWyH9KfvpdGiWqPa0MtD__ITW7-lXiNrEC