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depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

495 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext

[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
chromiumos/infra/crosjobs/linux-amd64
git_revision:ed616d595eb7241d39d34907050d2949121d6ae8
_vAeU0Q9lAxn933K8vDhwGK40zKVvV-yXGpIy43ATXAC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-386
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
Dx6GRWm8LMw2w5276IeJbhh77nw5hL7AFCdF7LGvZTYC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-amd64
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
dg8bVsNYc9gPxELjyy-6Ixk1PPp8ijcvmoty4Qw5LUYC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-arm64
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
ilTqmB7PuNcUX8KOx-bTfMyodEc7N5HDXTuFxfRndfQC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-armv6l
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
goUyfeFTqnrNlPbDE_sT2ikWjznLZOLOhCrKYxKxXNMC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mips64
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
ZocXScbzsLjlpC7MpukSSQpk7ZYiY_1vZAysIz6sR78C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mips64le
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
JcLmcykdMlD0G1SUHqVOxi3ru5FqureI4JrQExWCmsQC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-mipsle
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
gMXHBazeyWWeIGwg2B1H0TeU8J-LabBLBBQzk5ashvkC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-ppc64
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
wCnHQLb9QQ9hjsjTxv9TOpCQzzKCoiJODbJuNYR6FxcC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-ppc64le
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
kbHWz3lfqCCnzeFvfIRlZJuESwphZQyojHmlB38QK28C
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/linux-s390x
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
YYTtLHpvkMrsgxaj8DdlLRXACZs6Q1ZVstFBnZz_mzAC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/mac-amd64
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
PPcZPkyb28b8HkCK7XVtxFzEPSJy4xriuksifVCx6uIC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/mac-arm64
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
dtc7PeC62kNv188tRZiMO5PEOJDTNgYsXDuBFuzIWRoC
infra/chromeperf/pinpoint/windows-amd64
pinpoint: Update Pinpoint CLI This change includes the following commits from the infra/infra repository: 97ee9cecaa Pinpoint: introduce fakelegacy-based smoke test. (chowski@google.com) 7f5c67efcb pinpoint: Translate ExperimentCommit properly (dberris@google.com) 6c32245733 Pinpoint cli: add actionable error when GCS credentials fail. (chowski@google.com) 5ed9722479 pinpoint fakelegacy: support /api/new endpoint. (chowski@google.com) 9d26e75b86 pinpoint: add copyright heading to files which are missing it. (chowski@google.com) 2c07962627 Pinpoint server: use the new ShouldBeStatusError assertion more. (chowski@google.com) 830e31f6b1 Pinpoint server: add unit test for ScheduleJob. (chowski@google.com) c27f979330 Pinpoint cli: infer some flag defaults from `git cl issue`. (chowski@google.com) ed69e2428f Pinpoint fakelegacy: support ListJobs. (chowski@google.com) 5f0e1e9a35 Pinpoint: first stab at a fake Legacy Pinpoint implementation. (chowski@google.com) 3aae5c2e6b pinpoint: Support wait+download for experiments (dberris@google.com) 6a634f7926 Replace 'master' with 'main' in test data. (chowski@chromium.org) 81ccbd091d Pinpoint server: support ListJobs' filter argument. (chowski@chromium.org) 575bd02e5a pinpoint: Update docs, support non-chromium/src (dberris@google.com) e53451b2ca pinpoint server: support Cancel RPC. (chowski@chromium.org) cb65ecf501 pinpoint: Reduce duplication in server_test (chowski@chromium.org) e91e4e899d pinpoint: Support optional patchset for CLs (dberris@google.com) R=dpranke@google.com Bug: chromium:1175615 Change-Id: I4ac6407d822bf1905cbba02d29649ac4e400aecb Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2807336 Auto-Submit: Dean Berris <dberris@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@google.com>
4 years ago
git_revision:97ee9cecaac4d99be09278169f987e61b8116672
kPQcJGGgJc7rPEL8chx9dd3JnDVkrWeoT5vG1Nf6WBUC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/goma/client/linux-amd64
git_revision:f5efece09286e7fab5fe52a77a6f3bd515718ae6
KEe3h9iBuvGK1k_uGq74q0J7Mqs_TDD3tSOQ3hnvkQ4C
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/goma/client/mac-amd64
git_revision:f5efece09286e7fab5fe52a77a6f3bd515718ae6
HlThEKNzLajyWEid11jf3oaA6S9mi78AKO7qDBpH2L8C
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/goma/client/windows-amd64
git_revision:f5efece09286e7fab5fe52a77a6f3bd515718ae6
aBpIgkKOyQlS5WayaZEThpfbFSkl2qcdFI7uPY_ZvykC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-386
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
nfuWcouxLXZ_QVTBQzTYeBclxdmbEP978PMBcu6D2YEC
infra/tools/bb/linux-amd64
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
ukfK0rEDJnHssVOzMJQjXyJ_wMGaonJw_jDB_xP1HsYC
infra/tools/bb/linux-arm64
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
FwjZxkgPOcSr4yUSJvuAx2dLI967HjkYL392NmQcLKQC
infra/tools/bb/linux-armv6l
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
Ge7N8w-FrbE4TZCDfg53f-ZvqnEIo-pOjZYG5QrZGeEC
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
DzcJgGarfTYpoV8_i6w2857RVQJtC802WovJk6QDonUC
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64le
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
b-ei3R_nxMcOWg2pzGYXSFA0S6rZXcBW8wWELConZ0IC
infra/tools/bb/linux-mipsle
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
9k95gMDhSZlc8m754MyTM5EF25GR8GxUcrEhTjzbS0UC
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
bJg0fWoBWyWkgR2xy6kPAz_LhcQ9wCcAEdjbESSnRZ0C
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
7RJpQpPnhYsZGqyKN1NK4hQST2HO_X9qY6AVvQD1B6UC
infra/tools/bb/linux-s390x
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
lMzl9b9o_T9HwNoVIDV_yT-39D7iot0OTFLhgScQ7_sC
infra/tools/bb/mac-amd64
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
BGLhCtjzuucq3hS6L7Cb8WU-1r90a9RzY-gzAcpEJcEC
infra/tools/bb/mac-arm64
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
DC9rpnYPFvhpYsR5duBtPYfpNattWUfpcA4h9sxanHcC
infra/tools/bb/windows-amd64
git_revision:1563088c23532d1e45b8c3041afb9458c1788fc3
B__VpnkTIRXnZyy1hueecfk78ZCZEBIQV2bgMn-ZIooC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-386
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
B9tMsIhec3lGlIQhQ6gn2sLxjk_X_W_8k6RPFLtWahUC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-amd64
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
HSTWiNz_VSn9EHoykJfGCDEp3TPdD7fGxjBDYAra0PYC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-arm64
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
QLaVYpk79HizHrkk3Uthk6WWIckbBiPfGBFId0aq45kC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-armv6l
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
iCB8PRhr0R19YXS3pkqlllV1slUzRUx93kLSm3cMo68C
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-mips64
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
EwS8xQhPNLdUFHAO74yrlxXdFtiXNPsv12GR3B4BN-YC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-mips64le
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
4XzPmt1ngbZchflWlDzPhZPD793Jcb1EXJRBhlN89-cC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-mipsle
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
fz_C9IDwV-8PE8rcVA1jhgNf8oFoqIpeW36rEEZCVBoC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-ppc64
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
1uab40HcOgnpMlHo6uEHAAmtmINaTm7_r1MoEa65SqIC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
d8MxLNYzF3zrDIXxeS1Gdc2TL-jzvNBeQ17VG6z5_skC
infra/tools/dirmd/linux-s390x
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
Dj8sG0gJjGfKwO7ykL3U1Vv9VLVHgxBf_muya2iIADYC
infra/tools/dirmd/mac-amd64
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
zEcXRMBYi8JZx_k5XfFNvt-IxoLDkLtBC-qa1JGodlYC
infra/tools/dirmd/mac-arm64
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
Ca0gw6VfGYUnYX6c8fzltA_XI0QhX5p5eV3NNztGOpsC
infra/tools/dirmd/windows-amd64
git_revision:9279002e230abdc26e4f482d44f543dddc087d38
9iuUr0aUUJHM_FOoJwZ0sI9JWe4WWxrH2CWjGAEm22kC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
eP17h5YJMrU6hWBOvjZxWCz5h9SgkkW-vVF7W-L9qwIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
Xf6nFp5RbFKQLUk7d3O5LKPmmdnAF8NU4NsoO0QGP1UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
owOKUdyWr11KyfuCRigGRsBM7uPnOMVrH_WOMYYCGJYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
iZa8O1smpKFTta3pQVz9TaIOlRIu31V4QPgGbIVkCgYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
s6dXt6MAJ8kreqm79HyghgHg9mk93u8ju303d1RIZ4cC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
K2S9QpIR4701H7N2E6Fm9iGCOg8hwa3mY51S1CmrwdEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
0jLzmuxOsRVyYofMKQfgivPZOtxsXv0Slcr1dRU78UgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
7SK4rFVEOeA4CqHD0mKebTOCx7viE-dJMakFqE6W6BsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
ZruNFqBhC_reTL2dw3wf-t17dc_sPZJ_733R6BLBvMsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
8q6NmriGR1GiT9e-UlHeau2VMkcN0UYumU8AVDLIsZMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
pxk-T_GADDuTTtmbUsK3TlMHbsMD8jb5Dt383XPmeeYC
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-arm64
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
cR0PKTchP7f5iIXZdCSffnp_p1_ySee-16Gg56qhxqIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
git_revision:297491c0babda68d84d8240c9d4504be671bc804
McEKBb2FM2gMj1og3guOfA_jd690eGivhdSbKP90ruwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
URNSUWaPvgkShVa1KnmAtoL5azW--NJQIznYqMqJsAsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
arYTWbSh0C6lD_sK_kJz2-0cZY_OhQmrn5in49biwiIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
oeVqY9SkMvgpT3i5SZR8UTxGem0jBmUBO38A7r_xelwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
KP9zXh4xaBORwkbQ3SQgllrhgI1mlsY8kkLK6lsnQ6YC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
dM81VMaSFTGT6Y0J7SMKVkEj5slPcjPOXZViume-EBEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
NyJLdeAtnCXn1xtiP-uya0xTRS4tFlHgDN5ta9abhBwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
98hERW5iHex2Ayz6sJTYgF_zOJaWhWWvGelswsIjpR0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
OignQzQH5fIxDHPYKZmG7VnEdl3Z94ZiD4iuF6er3AMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
4coaCH4ckQX7J33o3WykAPSGkiOafxUqK673YytMPrAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
Ve3gsDX8mBVAlUQ0h-5i78zblyvA33sQzCKQtneeyMYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
4G7W0ODHFwvftRI3J3LSeOeK73E2eTF7fQr-nGK-TW0C
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
EMB0seZ_Mxl01SvYptP_gBsSoPCnQeUVZA7IEYOzvusC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
CM6tNbvHbG4E_N-UMN-YGmiSewH3KU4aIPaKEeRyCjYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
Y8Ek36y7b22QsNhnCMSXwR7QpNbNVQi5lX1i3b7KRKMC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
YxcAZcBh1UCNZjRNvtSfo9vgtKLbMD5P5I9nbmw0--EC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
iHVo6ANvfusz5ckKkxWu_NpYflFNf02fdiN9f3ZoBkEC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
es1tnfFnPuHE_0vhfJPGwmHmSNAAKFE0xnNuijmgpAMC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
S9g4y0I8CqUEE1iAXk9w0xL4j3skjxKTdcTGRw1F2AUC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
jBaTODjx6l4rHLXTVo8Djev53TdNDTeX8vnMKmc-H2EC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
e_rqrr_nkUB8Fq3EGnNPX2pMNJOQhi8lTVBJ_B2dLyAC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
lFPd6KlRl4zMVjNXqUFEI0TJAFIZNerxdwfhUsvRHeoC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
ktGPyKeEArzhIgCe_pKn-oWlY418iKZ79UvUOU7dMIYC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
u6AIOEDa7ON8bev9c0Z4fhEv6nU2jX5xG-in-Fsa0LwC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
io5xlWMHJlMlHjj7IXSsBgRmWcq62Rd3BTnryGkB6U8C
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-arm64
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
MOOImqx3de3lit0Oo6u1BvWeIKJp4WgcsctyBhc4a3oC
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
git_revision:d759c61ccfabc12e0da549ccc25aa8bfdaf37615
fGTX4AKfieWa9pZM2mjcEppEVnYZgQnXPeIWhe2NTxEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-386
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
2ruKSm1VF5rRMSQs8QpnQJDEVjvmDf_QjK6f0lfX7ecC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
4wgGcwE-qbz1L7FAqp2Sl7BFQ12fLTHUjQfMG6vIP_kC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
mQqeVAXponWeGV3pO1qBONt6p1pwMAMdWUx3cEqCK2gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-armv6l
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
CExmUu7q4mkcknQUkU1UWJ5vYcl5H7OV977r9UFZWcoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
7V2J7__lxjjF_nWO5uvN5mquCsmo5KPEFNVnQhOFTmcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64le
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
tuooVoVP6VEUY14Wx-btJwQN5fgSjIq1DopXiFbMQ1sC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mipsle
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
7NGflC_Sdl6uWq4pLx4Noho208zc0uKZ4hedAHwqGbEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
trAK_mT97Th9c3Z3RNqRgZERqn-R6rDGKRVJ_9PRPT8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
NBhpFMIXgTkg1fYjWCVMZys6O_32nANW_WxY_drrLEAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-s390x
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
Bk36BhXxXAJ4k0WQYXKXP5XmTU2C2hMOORyN6Gxn6msC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
RgLsjwuofDcDILewynEfuiQqERiawSOrp2n1oSz5ASkC
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
l-R1IIcoskcFcLsMYK4ZtAr0gLbpw2bZ3SFNcwzCHt0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
yZ43k64yE6PS84BCPjxw4ZMEXZzzkxuBA9t9ZwesgIMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
jG64q5ZTG9M9pCrAtrc7U-OnlnHBT-R-tlzpoH5Ac0kC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
c7zREjzvqW-OWtk7lA6EKb67ZmsziuMrUjN0ZulQ-L0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
NMhFUzejvjQIiV5bmMPGlmh22AR3lvg6_LnqCxVs90oC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
W-1qNoaEoIMoLQZiwIi3Mniiirl6w6SmPbLMrG6qR7IC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
_TJP_DSBvKBLRsELGo1pE4ACmcHVC-g8Ay4Z76oMF48C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
c32yDGBnO-_nuY01PPb0BmFD3mTrHnGIW-1gJGhOlmwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
EC6VSGPEk-1jIrNKeJmwpXlEN_7-TbzXysgyn13oSBoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
tAUa8HKCYSxuJGsyn7AZgbj4h2_PIvUxqcHWprK3gkcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
eYrdMuDBUiypBxOHbeFXW6biRRUaQTuFG4x6qMpvrWIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
Lpa6yMxnDgH3ZsxkzKrUKbUwikvZFpBs8VvsqmgiitcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
XEDr7UcCP9ZaYD0JaajPIIUbDuGdUu9t5HCKkKTX01MC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
WHhHSan56GNtiuqRFPxsvh8NOJVbiC8pu9IdTru-5b0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
L53gVrGaRNpYo2cEWTfZO4JMet8e1LNMlkNIYQKGSEAC
infra/tools/prpc/mac-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
63ICGLS_pq0YLXo0gljqa0LqHa37T8K_mCSJ37UkweQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
6Oa6Qp8os-roqwHgFdTaA0vlYp_ub6gSPA6Nmo-R9zwC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-386
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
g2nW1jgOwccS8k-NnhuH0_EtE4rnOLwoPbCX1WRKSrAC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
WGj2cWQY1fzivMoP6P-Z1LsA0UgOXyink3SYXxiJngcC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
dMNHdI0sonWcGP-KbB3fl6HaVMoMB1tU-j2er1j3adwC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-armv6l
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
DJKX14vRXnWaVqNHTw8FRc0sh7uid5wAlMn6fQWQdKUC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
mknoduEoLNKV8haLaqW1RLLje-vDh-pxSv9pvNxaJ88C
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64le
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
2fgE_fYfHDQ5XGQeFjqBcINrn3z9JkAiZ83F-bVdhQUC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mipsle
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
48lxT7Uil-gZm2NRlacpxKiGaQ9tOR7lczNmGDLkiswC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-ppc64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
sly74_9_CZUqepW-70eOciwSy-U4hZifmo8AoVjSKmcC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-ppc64le
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
P9t2RSHXL9U6imVkSt0xV2ESgYN-TVw6p0PnygQrShUC
infra/tools/rdb/linux-s390x
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
dvg9ty_dryRtQsIiEtByicRxmLLjwkTDHmOEkLRAp_EC
infra/tools/rdb/mac-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
-F0XksvQrPA6j1Zl4pnksFDIDqWXsRpvX3jtQJWseZ8C
infra/tools/rdb/mac-arm64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
vE1wc3Zla6JnCK-s75yeLICLHBnzkqA_OyWm18RdzUIC
infra/tools/rdb/windows-amd64
git_revision:e75c9bf286fbb31347379cb478df2a556ab185b1
cNMPVk08E3I8FxubmTcAFOJOlBerzUS3r8-0E6-ZH5oC