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depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

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[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
Add crosjobs to cipd_manifest BUG=chromium:973247 Change-Id: I8be6386fc3ab9ce6e8d9558862dfd0a7c74a5e6d Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1743018 Commit-Queue: Yaakov Shaul <yshaul@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
chromiumos/infra/crosjobs/linux-amd64
git_revision:ed616d595eb7241d39d34907050d2949121d6ae8
_vAeU0Q9lAxn933K8vDhwGK40zKVvV-yXGpIy43ATXAC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/linux-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=191 Bug: b/149440210 Change-Id: I818c556baa84b032172ea40263a1bc1cb7a592a1 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2064233 Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Simon Que <sque@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:e54b7f9e70ae92b328bcfeb5d21a96979180c423
lkpFHYrtpfyKVmwM4SIuTD650IsC3aJcuH_xQlpTUPYC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/mac-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=191 Bug: b/149440210 Change-Id: I818c556baa84b032172ea40263a1bc1cb7a592a1 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2064233 Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Simon Que <sque@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:e54b7f9e70ae92b328bcfeb5d21a96979180c423
2uD--YqjJO1JG1Jl52mQhdmI_PDmAvRTQmCq90hcWocC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/windows-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=191 Bug: b/149440210 Change-Id: I818c556baa84b032172ea40263a1bc1cb7a592a1 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2064233 Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Simon Que <sque@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:e54b7f9e70ae92b328bcfeb5d21a96979180c423
sU6SZ65SiRQfLkcYUMUSLn0dQN9y1uRIdUKEG0QDpjUC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-386
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
0ppx9iOx3TTt3qPAfo7FrxgfcSve_ShpOBfiB5BzPH8C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-amd64
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
8p6MPvTocoHE0DPQTUNS_LmsgSjT8glE5fG-HuW_OfkC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-arm64
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
RDHDQdWdzklG3VUtlPzNfip1wFOh_7Zfdar2aUbVXHwC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-armv6l
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
_7c_FOkd8q4wqEN78jEvqX7UCCw5PBz459Jh7jgvM1cC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
lbWzwENPRyM7EnybPEg-vj0gkL3QwqKev27ZVhatlbMC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64le
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
EPSJ0gy9e3P2fU9kBIFF8J1zeIxAyNnZniaq-F2sh4sC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mipsle
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
V3ZMLdkh316Wqm5jXPSNQWSMZlLv9sERQLkksttknzoC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
fylIUvIndq8yaz_o6zZEPtIiIR6K7kzOZK6VJID-KzwC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64le
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
AS8mzjiRD-MiOGzMGz9jyQ02O5w9MKTLTrXKDUX74iwC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-s390x
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
EX5YcuvuY45NZp8_Lbe8EUJ--Jn4UcArSs3UYqhdvkoC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/mac-amd64
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
tF0fKAXaE4ConPKd1CErCjMw5IXzqVt76Pc7Jys_ufgC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-386
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
3ce1ZiHF_OijvV9r5apvg3C3hN53Hxwr-q4f7t-DfYwC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-amd64
Roll bb tool to @ 37d99607 Old revision: 1ab4441a Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/1ab4441a..37d99607 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/0f62d394..7ffc1965 Bug: 1052637 Change-Id: I49129e3f4e68961dbd6055a07f3d0a9cd7bc3111 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063381 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:37d996079e619623a08d72981ae2b1f3aa9eef27
jU0Kr-AZvATyGe3I0Z9Y-2Hlkdm53a3v8LCRLc1YWhwC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
8TWSqbfcomDrxK72OV-nPlCUsb58EiGmWPI7Ml3C1j4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
nVALr-QAQcGQzbeduXLm18hqyxFmi2NxfJ--3iW7BhUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
hV3ksc0ub0GrxOx8C4hMOfjswtKrdHYl8Svt6_1RrDgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
Qq9BPtwG3VKRHHwEwI2-8W8nPeyLeVL1Nvhw2uTG50gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
Arr-nYTrW89jp-E6g1NXpkZ2Er8q4CJm7A1Z6FnYcJIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
j65WEvX_eRsHFUZ8zAQDZF2eadCfdCp8RYgHQOm2_a0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
QXLayUV_TvsPU2ak8YFFH9yCN3y45HlYr_I_nN69JK4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
CrEGeZSEp8erFoF07WfO17_XLIgKGiCBr1HSsVpRGa0C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
0rogC4GEIKSXnV8Na5fKIrDe8fsRF8Q4yTMNqdGMVCEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
3el1lBm8KsCamV8r8H2e052zg-Yf6t4pZdUzuyWRm44C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
9SZu6I4X6qu0mqPhjD2U7YmLk1SkPPh4x5hUhvIHTdUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-386
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
l3cXhvcusi9ypW-29WeabxvkEVjQ6p1Xwc80VfLTqNwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
GBs8p3OBQPPVvztd0oS5qFhvEy5JVvPZFnbod0DZ-FAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
gDmfjgb3BEflqEhO_krNIX8rHyHtYOG_646eyxJnkAgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
JfbZ84-030THccrx1bt76ttYLQdlGelcqbWRCWQhosIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
y-XGlsH7eLgByh1-a3FVavt1WWDxX3iISEPHhr3WoWcC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
zhxsuiptydyslnQS1lNzB3jB1MkEZO_QVFaY90WSNOkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
xlU29rpn0g7UfFk7ApqwCL1y7-8mA-lnsRjvW_x4e30C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
GMr1ZNJXU7yGJeSDqTpjH9yHVgzzQedLQkJfOY9NfUoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
B5dmyOF2wpvsea4n7-lVeATe7uFYoERaD68qJkoKkSIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
Pohe6tmDwK4dKz1mXYMsm6qkzWZnfq4tpNK-qZ1w5BEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
zO3a5ZBM1B0uzNOWwRRYUe5C4St3AeuygH-sd5fxz5sC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
g8zcyLIRAUKaSx1XyHj5wF7lc2FaIhLHjfL6u-ywsfUC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
LEZlk8BQ9q6ScJjVXRXBHTY9dMlYqmmvwJgH_L8ciycC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-386
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
33J-_RFWits3USHI4J65qENsjb0GO2NRt1WZNjnEPM8C
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
Roll led to latest version 4799a3f49 led: Allow addition of tags dd18cbd33 Fix issues with includes in isolates e81321f62 Fix no CipdInput bug e55b92767 [led] Don't set launched_by_led property Bug: 1015682 Change-Id: Ic67cc1339658a465ba154cb6d44fb84d74255c1c Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1871767 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Stephen Martinis <martiniss@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:4799a3f4989e43e0dae5c35dfe5ce76cbdbb6125
Lw3JGnXTz-SLluP-TO8fXuj8nSuHAbuHshy_jjQs0bsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
mXPbwFsd1DXkc13KxSjWybv5HZzQPKmSWaS1pT-yKhEC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
3hhoaWsMHmwL4h-Ffkkf6nDEalhg7TYJz8H2D_xXYsgC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
uNKMgsW2ZgWdzqAWMTLltya1CSi1Kb7PlS8KdjABkvsC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
gQjpNYSCSVA3wGKkjwxe6WvHdAF7wyo8IYCiInjZVCAC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
WvASPz_yviQT8miBp3BYT8EI8sfuwDa6YTalBIY445cC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
FYBdbqzLGQGYBGk_qp4Gd9T5vJcc3m6cRIGyIg19iJMC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
Ozp_zXsYzihhpj_ufatjH3kzXkCGl3CyZ6DJ_pBV1cEC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
sHkdSsXrWOEuFM-gYu4cgjgyOt7fGd-nzpfzsxEgq5QC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
V6XJbu23QZSOvKTVEXbpZ607B6lpOQYNOF_lRV_VT78C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
qE3isZHkZSDWGa6V43D1-aPpK2gxNVxNI8-zqWk5YeYC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
NzX7Z6t9o2sGV8azOwpIK_TH3MJDXvO1Gsmv2O38BQMC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-386
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
4Lw6IJJZDQup-c1BUDbGag-WYGcfjsnkn_iYgat6bQIC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ 3b479f0e v1.12.3. Old revision: 54dac392 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/54dac392..3b479f0e luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/addc6508..ae97ada2/lucicfg Bug: 925080 Change-Id: I5fb37c83b7e8a4d3e8aacb7fe29e3ea89c9683e9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2063216 Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:3b479f0e092b02f3b5160403090bd001f8be6147
vxgaZjqFVtdEi6BE0x_yWd5vmUwf91Bonl8syU2iIWsC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-386
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
p12ncKhbT04-gqgH3ZWR126YRV4Qn0ssMH5ww9Gbt_cC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-amd64
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
XnTGOVx5W80V3NjE9D5B6B2t84myntVlWApE0hyT_pAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-arm64
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
iZPzmQEQt_4pP_HooaVuNWlH3WWnOJfB5UYvyE8-2ZEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-armv6l
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
-lBrS1Ea8UV0-nRpICNRfG-y_TZHm6P1s8M1SVxlGRwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
N4_az1kpS7KtItogWfzE-G_OyTodnaX6z6WZireZgskC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64le
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
eWdqsllO9x7hFEJyo0gk7K1iEfRwtG0C6-BfB3AIEKoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mipsle
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
t4GoeXjkPvMwCWqaGIlo30gVT6boMqNIXdUIwQBD9RkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
1knpxUXtSRt2wcHMQo2IFb_PGUu46d2Wbg1GXFuzlI4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64le
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
7lAcnEWiZF7tZ7s0qYg9-M6VdunFY-L3X1fZY5qqhL4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-s390x
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
xihfAQ7D9BMuXyThT63JS2eAL9rx_BHcksNv9H8fETEC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-amd64
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
T09UM3QPqUX5jULyItEDDZyGEn3Q4WWTF3MN9IexbsgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-386
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
7hlGHKktH3nZibKek-sllJcSkF1MC3AfLqmbtzemj_oC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-amd64
vpython: e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a. Includes 2019-10-23 tandrii@google.com vpython: more logging when incomplete virtualenv dir can't be removed. R=iannucci Bug: 869227 Change-Id: Ie06fc55322ac5a467a8ac78c7f8b6ad42bcf0aa9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1877553 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Auto-Submit: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
6 years ago
git_revision:e317c7d2c17d4c3460ee37524dfce4e1dee4306a
zpB5bl4KxFHnuQy-BcTh6GVhXIzYcG3SSKvpoDKYSXYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
Pin mac_toolchain to 9a1adc55bf4a1173784da3ba2f8cb06421606748 Bug:978867 Change-Id: I92bdef0d5871354a442947fbf74614ce0d896aae Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1859896 Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Lindsay Pasricha <lindsayw@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:9a1adc55bf4a1173784da3ba2f8cb06421606748
RiLbLddPgcxbnzu6nBOHc6RWmP6zO6vWQtWr9zoW2qQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
tGUz4jW0Ade3imPLEFKRw_P4bjAS7bv5m2PlzVQ6jz8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
pExQS2vSbmaeBkZkdOavcI4eVXfEvox789FgQBPHsxIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
saOhcc1VfDbTUCoKjK8pySKKM7Iey3PBMnX-oo4Uu6UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
mgp4kRNoetXPvq-H537SBuI2-UbuX7DTEZoYvRhKmCsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
7ZJBF9a0cErmn8KtWNWr_sZzirXlrs_uDqy0pBG3eYQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
RSTGfX_zpPdAS-yB2dkffiB-rM6278zuDanNFXaOEscC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
AqDFThd6i2ZradBxxPgj8iSl1ZIHzFw6mClJ2fTSX9oC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
g5rarKCGPYw-711M2yaB1Jo4sRa9_YB26IKQoxtRE60C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
pqNZUNS0AOD30-ODWPT8H1ZM82pmjV5rZbvbhFnHXtsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
WKRLbWviTHeAaXMNXy4jNbX9mxMwOpX0I5ZHLOClD-QC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
C1jj72eXIs6P6BqI5JKCB7aWunWNwM8-0HoioGEbAc8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-386
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
jQzFRINB55LRit23_YVllNePCZscUR9iebEKbvIKB2UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
7 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
97GIuWDvHohWyH9KfvpdGiWqPa0MtD__ITW7-lXiNrEC