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depot_tools/cipd_manifest.versions

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[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
# This file is auto-generated by 'cipd ensure-file-resolve'.
# Do not modify manually. All changes will be overwritten.
Add crosjobs to cipd_manifest BUG=chromium:973247 Change-Id: I8be6386fc3ab9ce6e8d9558862dfd0a7c74a5e6d Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1743018 Commit-Queue: Yaakov Shaul <yshaul@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
chromiumos/infra/crosjobs/linux-amd64
git_revision:ed616d595eb7241d39d34907050d2949121d6ae8
_vAeU0Q9lAxn933K8vDhwGK40zKVvV-yXGpIy43ATXAC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/linux-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=200 https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/goma/client/+/ccc8255ac04a4f79a4649168c04ffdaa59af649b Bug: b/156546740 Change-Id: If754346ec49c7314b13160ea682c630e0e5ccd21 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2208512 Commit-Queue: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com> Auto-Submit: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@google.com> Reviewed-by: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:ccc8255ac04a4f79a4649168c04ffdaa59af649b
t4xI2z6TP3MnYo_m4-gwUpihmrA6g0ijeOg2jxXKIgYC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/mac-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=200 https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/goma/client/+/ccc8255ac04a4f79a4649168c04ffdaa59af649b Bug: b/156546740 Change-Id: If754346ec49c7314b13160ea682c630e0e5ccd21 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2208512 Commit-Queue: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com> Auto-Submit: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@google.com> Reviewed-by: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:ccc8255ac04a4f79a4649168c04ffdaa59af649b
QVYMbbX0xz60YPmi9bhN_mLuTAPCA5E1TJp-n1WWAvwC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/goma/client/windows-amd64
Roll out new goma client binary VERSION=200 https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/goma/client/+/ccc8255ac04a4f79a4649168c04ffdaa59af649b Bug: b/156546740 Change-Id: If754346ec49c7314b13160ea682c630e0e5ccd21 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2208512 Commit-Queue: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com> Auto-Submit: Ye Kuang <yekuang@google.com> Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@google.com> Reviewed-by: Yoshisato Yanagisawa <yyanagisawa@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:ccc8255ac04a4f79a4649168c04ffdaa59af649b
hAGz3Hy69Zx_cGELRGOlsHTXJhmT7regpW0Dp8MrPUEC
Reland "put goma client in depot_tools" This reverts commit a0aed87f71211aff48e3c06802d173cdf21328cf. Reason for revert: install goma client without update_hook update_hook would disrupt current users, so start without update_hook, which means goma cient in depot_tools user might need to restart compiler_proxy manually when updated. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pnwfkU6Rd9dRtQC0sg2vATmyRbkYWhnNUTD5k1PddC0/edit# Original change's description: > Revert "put goma client in depot_tools" > > This reverts commit 77780358011f8e20c68ba10aa1282f1f9f65734f. > > Reason for revert: AttributeError: 'GomaEnvPosix' object has no attribute 'RestartCompilerProxy' > > Original change's description: > > put goma client in depot_tools > > > > install goma client cipd package in depot_tools. > > > > should not use $MYPATH/goma_ctl in cipd_bin_setup > > since $MYPATH/goma_ctl uses cipd_bin_setup in itself, > > so causing recursive calls. > > invoke python to run .cipd/goma_ctl.py in cipd_bin_setup > > instead. > > > > Bug: b/77663154 > > Change-Id: I9f82c766a886a2acfb899e3594e5f05a7b7bc75a > > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1866350 > > Reviewed-by: Edward Lesmes <ehmaldonado@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> > > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > > TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com > > Change-Id: Ie050dfb524dd885634c31be829d733613e80aece > No-Presubmit: true > No-Tree-Checks: true > No-Try: true > Bug: b/77663154 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1872129 > Reviewed-by: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org> TBR=sque@chromium.org,ukai@chromium.org,yyanagisawa@google.com,vadimsh@chromium.org,dpranke@chromium.org,tikuta@chromium.org,ehmaldonado@chromium.org,yekuang@google.com Bug: b/77663154 Change-Id: I8bb51631e4418ff63953099814bdb464128eb279 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1875982 Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Fumitoshi Ukai <ukai@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-386
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
chW0tsmT3ZpGwNZtNAxuScbuCble99TBBd_eyAEYbDwC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-amd64
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
OqSGXQ9njhIh3Kv4DP9gkH33H3eY89zEozfdmsCBF9oC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-arm64
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
F94j_qJIJ7DMEshWen0SDk9NkSPmKdfYT35DlZ2qTfoC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-armv6l
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
hKFoEC4iHKA17PO_C9DD3538fIxd79Ea8-k4ycT0nxgC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
zEpWdOudpRJm0q5xQdPVrXuss-YH6IeTvKMb4kaoE0IC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mips64le
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
VKoZTVtixnm6Jty7evtqBIdcGr_GGaNWnqehni1GNXgC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-mipsle
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
AgtKqHlEO5cZ8SWc3uIX78HxnsVQgAWGze1JOtADEBAC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
aijTaDEt7VBJYrU7iOYin_3TgXKzB_blt_Zws1QITn4C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-ppc64le
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
tNBCTGmOgRDkPVvjpRby570qVQmCCi-s62UilvCDblsC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/linux-s390x
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
JB8M18LEOkUd_f5XsbYZj5KwFmPwx6yuBKtXBMdFDisC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/mac-amd64
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
-vONwSrmlGyEmWAfjoTr7-ir6gANZ_sOsGpUp4ILzbIC
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-386
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
pnAK8G7hw5dceI3vuYjnKbMwvWfFy4bw4wQ2d61xDmoC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/bb/windows-amd64
Roll bb tool to @36780e0 Old revision: 37d9960 infra/infra change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/37d9960..36780e0 luci_go change log: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/7ffc196..f45bbc1 R=tandrii Change-Id: Ic7e342c356d5e91d37aa89f70faae4adf3525e7f Bug: 1054982 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2070062 Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Auto-Submit: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:36780e0d5ac28dd0d8e2eeb69c67ae51a4ad2685
GBMj0Vve2DPrT_zeFqd99RIgUDpPMU6nPgYKFWIeiA4C
[bb] Deploy bb Add bb to depot_tools Bug: 946422 Change-Id: I7f1e5463b7bb1170124c94066b660a1b972884bf Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1550200 Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-386
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
S7nV6gi0qgpCMJb5mGPSFWl2EhqS0U4mUn4B-6D3gPYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-amd64
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
Whz-SaaUikWI9DGh8K9dhF3wqqG8Zz16k2--Fk89-oAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-arm64
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
5nd678GlSFuC0ID0x2lvUB4MVV7jKtUXOkkFv_e7cNkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-armv6l
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
35zt0OEuW3So7X_9sxjd5AGeVVcCYjTMv9kVUk5gCfkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
7SbuCJyt3NAk7owkDVr8_x9oKM8MZaTglB2YneNSDUYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mips64le
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
B8xUAiUGOPFHOHRKF0kxFXy20TTGrMUD2mUi-XAjhxgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-mipsle
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
QGkDWE7DuTSsyhaIZo_iFfgT98G8cPRf1533a28-D_4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
stgUQOdxmo4Q4fSYBlPf5HMwiNIOf7Zeybv99vlgORMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-ppc64le
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
yPUIV0I1b72PJNvySO67BO7P5Y6jfvgQdrJSkVXiUV8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/linux-s390x
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
wTbZDTT7h2IqOxIOlmm9HVysvM27kEQalcGWn92jmCIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/mac-amd64
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
PrR0x7_QDVh9aWC7SOICHsEKif0PKdmLh_3cwH6BssoC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-386
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
MQaOH4GvhBKn6BqTN-aqwDjxVx8JnFGf6fEvgMjYrrQC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci-auth/windows-amd64
Roll luci-auth. Updating to match crrev.com/i/2720965. Bug: 1059948 Change-Id: I36a24a488978d00e164504e9a6d3eeb51aab6da2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2095862 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:41a7e9bcbf18718dcda83dd5c6188cfc44271e70
8iYYbKDa-fRVkxsrL6iPsUWaN-Ld9xONkbagVpqT6WkC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-386
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
Z5hglBCNKHmHrBLPEaxO8ZWifivCEdeBRfWIM9k-OcsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-amd64
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
m0J4r0N6Nq9D1JcIdwFwYsnF4Pihp3j54y2VUqCOyFMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-arm64
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
sUC57R5xlPVbsQWiEjS2UklTr_D1JYAfKS-JHCgeO40C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-armv6l
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
kIqXZYkWI_bNtNMMi-1mWO5xr7-lWJepKDkHgweRzb4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
BZ07APUMwkghq9cG6pA0KHYv_RRIGRlDmf8EfUVnRygC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mips64le
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
qQb3uCEHirycjxuSNMW365xcoUf-ymFVdFW0GVFLXk4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-mipsle
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
pAZTQTkZx4lzEqOMJyzcnpfx5CKOmvM9SpzRQWxiAPgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
BkYh6Ltb7bkQkUoa4MHSLfgUFB6nv2sQ_0MJlHFDXUQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-ppc64le
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
5TKb4lNwrGtqggfwMJDw5rtY_9dxnTzuxUOQ4IgceQ4C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/linux-s390x
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
4vx9chpnpwyNSGI7BpXWvaWsX0Pp_Vpv3tcctKz4LzsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/mac-amd64
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
kXwYhPfS4FhAIaAVnAKuJ64vbe-1pijyxed28-RPYHwC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-386
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
TpeeTsW1o4-C2AOPJ1sir0N0BaugMH22IISdXSTYmrgC
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/led/windows-amd64
[led] Roll to ledv2 in depot_tools. This has stabilized on the bots and early field testers, so I think this should be pretty safe for the remaining users. R=ehmaldonado@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1017818 Change-Id: Iae0a036646e1ef87087625dd4b1bd1fbbe9286c4 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2184744 Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com> Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yiwei Zhang <yiwzhang@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:66c64bda2fe4d205e45df36d9b309d1aa07f28d8
v8v-p58ARGZg_vCR30VZg8CPhkfi29okuViH6wUpOkAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-386
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
dJBnepDdO4WlG9xjVCLa7ocfQAqIzDyRcRSlRVdgeDgC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-amd64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
WvkJ-srQgll2gaz7RoVuebohg3jhEs77wkot0ofTVgAC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-arm64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
MyGVtuLFVNU57vt0GLn6Z5NUZlN1LiQQwAX6JVxzhlYC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-armv6l
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
k862PZF_C0p0dE_-UhumzEN9QevQiiTjfQQM99MirYsC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
lMowqU7f1aJZAwvRYf8hIEUpEbZX6vJ06nAkrHgdxIkC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mips64le
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
mQQh-YgHk37s7B1W6BZLFMwSPuAC2bzOnPDVhXXGfukC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-mipsle
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
0P3BO6j0wjWZz9-SiNS_ZM9r2VFPBzQ9fIXz9Ih3hT8C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
3MauvI9JZg4N6pclL0-kvXdqsQo3L5BH9C4AXrKOhucC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-ppc64le
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
nug3TtlAnYs8Jyycbkp08QOu8EFgShOPqVIfWDR9oPwC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/linux-s390x
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
N1LNWXAC7k8uTD5CVsAXpJBsJhuJAUmyOb57CeyllM8C
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/mac-amd64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
8woFvZ0U844q3ilw70eB6SnXZYMlR_Vyq-r2s7Md1tkC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-386
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
nLA28M5IlvyRpOAAGH8Rs-V7yCjPI-vPT54yrRFvfp4C
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/lucicfg/windows-amd64
Roll lucicfg tool to @ f3a7e781 v1.14.0 Old revision: 365f7220 Change logs: infra/infra: https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/infra/+log/365f7220..f3a7e781 luci-go https://chromium.googlesource.com/infra/luci/luci-go/+log/5922f348..82343c26/lucicfg Bug: 987411 Change-Id: Ie6bc9dd5b67bfd443321a882ba913291c8774301 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2188913 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
5 years ago
git_revision:f3a7e781f71b1898c976e50890eb82f56499c50e
tLYBXjdd-OgMKjSjVop2PN_8ZzWfOLDl_haVoTUgzeYC
[cipd] Add lucicfg tool. It knows how to interpret configuration files written in Starlark-based DSL and produce a bunch of protobuf messages as a result. Will be used to generate various infra configs. In particular, will be used by infra developers (to update configs), by PRESUBMIT.py on dev machines (to verify configs before uploading CLs) and by bots (to verify configs before submitting CLs). R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=833946 Change-Id: Iceec7d808ce180f7d4a341fab8b5ce11933c2a6b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1444499 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-386
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
b_yQiOho03hLW3u2EaIM770cNZUkGDID6L9R1UzA3NAC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-amd64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
fI6WggdkRyN1r91MnTeApc2_gyTtXfYpueHZVLcaF8gC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-arm64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
KTXfqwOx-7vF-latasoNKn2BBMYj93pSpoVyUjBxR4kC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-armv6l
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
iV_U4ATZiRqL-kn-bHlIXuN0HbesE3JldX0jjtcML94C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
HFWsUs5joBzipZoikQC49pm0HGIdohf54Z1NN65h2JYC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mips64le
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
MmWAsc-Z93O4YndQUeswJkqe0V2Lzp0EUlIfIyjkGNIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-mipsle
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
STZiSoEkTORWE9DuC27kz3LHnE7tmJeHb8_I-91QApIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
PsNbigRhVEYIafrrrVukgRpGxHjHvN0QsL72sXGJjHMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-ppc64le
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
pJVe9UUqCOvCQY5pwSCZlOD1_idrn-XAZWbYm_rwF-AC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/linux-s390x
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
5Ys59es6eOo03NAAqwyEgZ1s2nhKlQaq9-QSt_RJ-OMC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/mac-amd64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
jakO2il23U4ddld6XjrM6dUMF7PYkcs-ywOo5pNoSCgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-386
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
cU2aFKU6dgPd2SdVFZGIcJui8Dxi_cgp51b377GaZo8C
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/luci/vpython/windows-amd64
[vpython] Update depot_tools vpython to match fleet. This will make `vpython3` explicitly opt-in (so it will now behave the same way that it does on bots). R=qyearsley@chromium.org, smut@google.com, tandrii@chromium.org, vadimsh@chromium.org Bug: 1051595 Change-Id: I80cbc640ec76756381d8b1cc2755363180534b96 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2072361 Auto-Submit: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Quinten Yearsley <qyearsley@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:b01b3ede35a24f76f21420f11d13f234848e5d34
2cMbWqqVeig2-7NiGNCCdm0PVZ7Pqve0l7SYcSYVQqgC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/mac_toolchain/mac-amd64
Pin mac_toolchain to 9a1adc55bf4a1173784da3ba2f8cb06421606748 Bug:978867 Change-Id: I92bdef0d5871354a442947fbf74614ce0d896aae Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1859896 Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dirk Pranke <dpranke@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Lindsay Pasricha <lindsayw@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:9a1adc55bf4a1173784da3ba2f8cb06421606748
RiLbLddPgcxbnzu6nBOHc6RWmP6zO6vWQtWr9zoW2qQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-386
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
tGUz4jW0Ade3imPLEFKRw_P4bjAS7bv5m2PlzVQ6jz8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
pExQS2vSbmaeBkZkdOavcI4eVXfEvox789FgQBPHsxIC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-arm64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
saOhcc1VfDbTUCoKjK8pySKKM7Iey3PBMnX-oo4Uu6UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-armv6l
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
mgp4kRNoetXPvq-H537SBuI2-UbuX7DTEZoYvRhKmCsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
7ZJBF9a0cErmn8KtWNWr_sZzirXlrs_uDqy0pBG3eYQC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mips64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
RSTGfX_zpPdAS-yB2dkffiB-rM6278zuDanNFXaOEscC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-mipsle
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
AqDFThd6i2ZradBxxPgj8iSl1ZIHzFw6mClJ2fTSX9oC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
g5rarKCGPYw-711M2yaB1Jo4sRa9_YB26IKQoxtRE60C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-ppc64le
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
pqNZUNS0AOD30-ODWPT8H1ZM82pmjV5rZbvbhFnHXtsC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/linux-s390x
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
WKRLbWviTHeAaXMNXy4jNbX9mxMwOpX0I5ZHLOClD-QC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/mac-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
C1jj72eXIs6P6BqI5JKCB7aWunWNwM8-0HoioGEbAc8C
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
Revert "cipd: remove windows-386" This reverts commit 314e30187959f6a98d1f1498690c8537711cf0af. Reason for revert: On second thought, I don't think we want this. Original change's description: > cipd: remove windows-386 > > Running depot_tools on Windows 32 bits is not supported anymore. > > Add a comment to cipd_manifest.txt to help people to figure out by themselves > where to look to do a roll. > > Change-Id: I8a8c2d1437ec77c99588261e3eba0abdcb13c105 > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1630448 > Auto-Submit: Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org> > Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> > Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> TBR=maruel@chromium.org,iannucci@chromium.org Change-Id: I206becbf5bde4bb12e9d71ccab13027171fb017f No-Presubmit: true No-Tree-Checks: true No-Try: true Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/1633030 Reviewed-by: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Robbie Iannucci <iannucci@chromium.org>
6 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-386
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
jQzFRINB55LRit23_YVllNePCZscUR9iebEKbvIKB2UC
[cipd] Pin hashes of CIPD packages. Together with already committed cipd_client_version.digests file, this cryptographically binds contents of CIPD packages used by depot_tools with depot_tool's git revision (assuming the CIPD client pinned by cipd_client_version.digests is trusted too, which can presumably be verified when it is being pinned). This holds true even if the CIPD backend is compromised. The worst that can happen is a denial of service (e.g. if the backend refuses to serve packages at all). If a bad backend tries to serve a malicious (unexpected) CIPD client, 'cipd' bootstrap script (and its powershell counterpart) will detect a mismatch between SHA256 of the fetched binary and what's specified in cipd_client_version.digests, and will refuse to run the untrusted binary. Similarly, if the bad backend tries to serve some other unexpected package (in place of a package specified in cipd_manifest.txt), the CIPD client (already verified and trusted as this point) will detect a mismatch between what was fetched and what's pinned in cipd_manifest.versions, and will refuse to install untrusted files. cipd_manifest.versions was generated from cipd_manifest.txt by: $ cipd ensure-file-resolve -ensure-file cipd_manifest.txt This will have to be rerun each time cipd_manifest.txt is updated. There's a presubmit check that verifies *.versions file is up-to-date (it's part of 'cipd ensure-file-verify'). BUG=870166 R=nodir@chromium.org, iannucci@chromium.org, tandrii@chromium.org Change-Id: I25314adf0a9b05c69cd16e75aff01dbc79c87aa5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227435 Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org>
7 years ago
infra/tools/prpc/windows-amd64
[cipd] Rebuild all Go binaries with Go 1.12. Hopefully it works better on OSX 10.14. R=tandrii@chromium.org BUG=936067 Change-Id: I097802a053b7f17b81f13a69c1f0c153dc327b10 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489874 Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Vadim Shtayura <vadimsh@chromium.org>
6 years ago
git_revision:edd5644be66d37cdf82978efb0e5d6504d0d552f
97GIuWDvHohWyH9KfvpdGiWqPa0MtD__ITW7-lXiNrEC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-386
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
aUKXnHwYmv-xGkFtsEtVhM8xXP_Gtq0y5GztcPw43bwC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-amd64
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
ufzF-ZWoWvkavnfETwNR3eJZ1TqNOBgasA6cWmIsTn4C
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-arm64
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
LMW8obhKqOLFxMsOvAjk3fgURPSTThV3qvScYDsUkjEC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-armv6l
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
9x82RTUrb_ZuuZDW2QbussSP7-Dc3WSaCWDJ99JMH_YC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
pFJx7Gkf5oTDhkFWxff5N7ZNzOS-PW8NyCDvvdEWwnoC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mips64le
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
ucff03GKibmo68FIbJHAjnzD9vxSzO3x0L7kQWbpGE4C
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-mipsle
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
FaXFpjrRn6PkMY5-EQe74W5wfD7LQji1kMkA8uNuiVEC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-ppc64
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
tiN5AAOK501i63YDvXHhr-7aQkN3g6D5pE1f0ur11LcC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-ppc64le
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
EGtc4K6aFn8iSKo_ohdRZpzr0BMGMbYpgiaOUy0PawgC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/linux-s390x
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
qm6yX-hfud0yPaVtz7xctnu-EGHU0NxWjlPQznwbQZIC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/mac-amd64
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
9N3MnmT-jeOI7wSW7Fa2_UDz42G442d-00JC8hR3krMC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/windows-386
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
T1PD8JN89XAt0F8b7jum6x9I5JwKUQFMYi8anhbZWxQC
[resultdb] Add rdb to depot_tools Deploy rdb in depot_tools. It can be used to stream local test results and query results from the server. Change-Id: Ic2fe65952d24b79edd98bedb678ee220b165fef7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2176997 Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org>
5 years ago
infra/tools/rdb/windows-amd64
Roll rdb Roll to the latest version. R=ddoman@chromium.org Change-Id: I4aced3043371d20e8e05cba78b17c785c313dfe9 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/tools/depot_tools/+/2182264 Auto-Submit: Nodir Turakulov <nodir@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Scott Lee <ddoman@chromium.org>
5 years ago
git_revision:0f94c2c332c65e1061b0f0fbbbc56ae7be1a335d
mtL0J-brNCo-IeAz8fw00NUFpizeDPbE0_jieJcTsUgC